Managing public policy implementation : a critical review of the implementation of the child support grant in South Africa between 2000 and 2004. by Mtshali, Yvonne Lungile.
Title 
Managing Public Policy implementation: A critical review 
of the implementation of the Child Support Grant in South 
Africa between 2000 and 2004 
By 
Yvonne Lungile Mtshali 
B.Soc. Sc. Honours Degree in Policy and Development Studies 
Student Number: 204519079 
For coursework Masters: 
In partial fulfilment of the Masters Degree in Social Sciences in Policy and 
Development Studies, in the Faculty of Humanities, Development and Social 
Sciences, at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg campus. 
As the candidate's supervisor I have/kave—not* approved this 
thesis/dissertation for submission. 
Name: 
Date: 
til I ^**"<*" 
Signed 
' 3 / Oif-Ui 
ABSTRACT 
Policy implementation is an important aspect of service delivery. It is a 
process that requires all the involved parties to work together. In addition, the 
policy to be implemented has to be preceded by extensive planning and 
capacity to ensure effective implementation. According to Parsons 
(1995:465), "effective implementation requires a good chain of command and 
a capacity to co-ordinate and control...". 
The Child Support Grant (CSG) is one of the social security grants created by 
the South African Government to offer financial support to children in need. 
The CSG is the one that is widely accessed by children. This grant has 
reached millions of children in South Africa since its initial implementation; 
however a large number of children still do not receive this grant due to 
administration problems (Skweyiya 2005:2). 
This research project provides a critical analysis of the implementation of 
CSG between the years 2000 and 2004. A conceptual analysis (content 
analysis) of secondary studies on the implementation of the Child Support 
Grant is the scope of this investigation. The study analysed the manner in 
which the CSG had been implemented by the Department of Social 
Development (DSD) between the years 2000 and 2004. The findings show 
that there were many problems that related to the administration of the CSG. 
The problems ranged from lack of capacity (human as well as organizational) 
by government officials, to the mode (top-down) of implementation, the 
employment of bureaucratic methods of implementing policy, lack of system 
upgrade, street level bureucrats methods of implementing policies and 
insufficient monitoring and evaluation by the National Department of Social 
Development. 
The DSD neglected to provide infrastructural support to facilitate the 
additional number of beneficiaries that resulted from the extension of the CSG 
to children under 14 years old. 
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These organizational capacity development problems manifested in the lack 
of sufficient equipment in welfare offices. Many welfare offices did not have 
essential equipment (such as chairs, working computers and working 
telephones) needed to perform their duties. Technical resources such as 
working computers and telephones are an essential part of implementation. 
Lack of proper monitoring and evaluation of the administration of the Grant 
has created loopholes in the system that have cost the Department about 
R1.5 billion each year from 2000 to 2004. 
Another problem was that there were staff shortages in most areas. In areas 
where staff was available they lacked the capacity to administer the Grant. As 
a result, wrong information was disseminated to the public concerning the 
eligibility for the CSG. The data capturing system the Department uses, 
Social Pension System (SOCPEN), had not been upgraded to handle greater 
numbers of applicants. This has led to applicants not being processed, thus 
affecting service delivery. 
The study has shown the impacts these problems can have on policy. Due to 
the manner in which policy was implemented the DSD ended up losing 
money, which was intended for beneficiaries, through fraud and 
maladministration. In addition to money lost, potential beneficiaries could not 
access the Grant due to obstacles created by government officials as their 
way of implementing policy effectively. According to Lipsky (1980:149), low 
ranking street level bureaucrats create ways of coping with their duties 
through simplifying their authority. This enables them to utilise their authority 
and impose their job restrictions for reasons of lack of service delivery on their 
clients . 
Due to the scope of "allowed" discretion that street level bureaucrats can 
exercise, fragmentation of policy is most often experienced during 
implementation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The introduction of the Child Support Grant (CSG) is part of the democratic 
government of South Africa's (SA) initiative to reduce poverty and enable all poor 
children up to the age of 14 years to have access to financial assistance in the 
form of a social grant. 
As per amended legislation (Social Assistance Act of 1992), the SA government, 
since 1994, was obliged to provide social assistance to children in need. The 
provision of social security also serves as a means of addressing childhood 
poverty in SA. This social security grant was first introduced in 1998. The initial 
roll-out was implemented in late 1999. In 2001 an estimated 59% of children 
aged between 0 and 17 lived in poverty in SA (Cassiem & Streak 2001:120). The 
Department of Social Development stressed that poverty reduction remained the 
Department of Social Development's priority (Department of Social Development 
2002:12). 
The CSG benefits children who live below the poverty line. This grant has 
reached millions of these and other needy children in SA. However, a large 
number of children still do not receive the grant (Department of Social 
Development 2005:3). The obstacles to receipt of the grant have ranged from 
poor or maladministration of the CSG by government officials to lack of efficient 
monitoring by the national Department of Social Development and to lack of 
capacity organization (Skweyiya 2005:2). 
This grant was to assist in boosting the financial status of a child and a child's 
household. This monetary assistance is to be utilised for the child's well-being 
and to create a good environment suitable for the proper nurturing of the child 
(Department of Social Development 2002:12). Eligibility for recipients is through 
a means test. 
The implementation of the CSG has not proceeded in the manner anticipated by 
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the Department of Social Development. Various problems have emerged in many 
aspects of the implementation process. The theme of this thesis is a critical 
analysis of the administration of the CSG, as reported in secondary sources. 
More specifically, the study critically analyses the implementation of the CSG 
through policy theory and concepts. Some of questions used to interrogate the 
secondary studies were; 
1. What were the problems that have emerged in the administration of the 
CSG? 
2. Do these problems relate to a specific mode of implementation as 
described in policy theory? 
3. Were these problems also related to: 
> Street level bureaucrats' discretionary powers 
> Lack of organizational development 
> Constraining bureaucratic processes 
> A lack of backward mapping 
> A lack of sufficient monitoring and evaluation 
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Chapter 2: Policy Context 
2.1. Children's Grant during the apartheid era 
The welfare system in South Africa was created in the 1930s to assist white 
families who could not afford to take care of themselves and needed assistance 
from the state. One of the services that the welfare state of South Africa provided 
was monetary assistance to children who were in situations where they were 
struggling to survive because of poverty (Department of Welfare 1995:7). 
The welfare system during the apartheid era focused mainly on taking care of the 
needs of the poor white people and other needy groups by giving whites, 
coloureds and Indians state support in terms of state maintenance grants 
(Department of Social Welfare 1999:3). The welfare system had in place an 
administration process which was very complex and not easily accessible to 
black people. It had in place 14 different departments that were responsible for 
the administration of the welfare system for the different population groups. This 
led to an inefficient and ineffective service delivery by the Department of Welfare 
(Department of Social Development 1997:6). 
The system had no citizen or stakeholder participation and therefore did not have 
any welfare legitimacy. The poorest of the poor of the population of South Africa 
were excluded from the system. Furthermore, the Department of Welfare lacked 
sustainable financing, because the South African welfare system did not view 
social needs as important (Department of Social Development 1997:6-7). Even 
though there were organizations offering social assistance to people who needed 
it (organizations such as other social work agencies and Churches) these 
systems were not recognized and did not receive the government's support 
(Patel 1999:11). 
With regard to the grants for children, the Department of Welfare under the 
apartheid regime offered assistance to children separately from their parents. 
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Assistance to mothers and children was offered in a form of a State Maintenance 
Grant (SMG). The SMG was a form of state support that was given by the state if 
the state was not able to locate or get maintenance from the child's father1 due to 
unavailability through death, imprisonment or disability (Department of Social 
Welfare 1999:15). This grant was given to single mothers and their children. This 
was given to a child from birth to the age of 18 years. In 1996 mothers were paid 
R430 per month and children R122 per month per child up to two children (Lund 
2002a:20). 
2.2. Children's Grants during the Post-apartheid Era 
The reforming of the state is a process that is continuous and is mostly expected 
when a regime changes. In implementing reform the government attempts to 
redress the imbalances, inefficient economies, corruption and unresponsiveness 
of previous regimes (Grindle 1997:77). 
When the African National Congress (ANC) government came to power in 1994, 
there was a need for the welfare system to be reformed, because of the racial 
imbalances that existed in service delivery. The reformation of the welfare 
system allowed for the inclusion of black people into the system. However, from 
1994 to 1998 the new government was still operating under the old welfare 
system and still used the SMG as a form of state support for children in need 
(Department of Social Development 1997:23). This was to enable the transition 
to proceed smoothly, without cutting the supply of welfare services to the public. 
During this time, the new government embarked on a process of finding a more 
equitable welfare system. This was because, even though blacks were included 
in the system, people living in rural areas were still not included. This process 
was in the form of the Lund Committee and it made recommendations to the 
government (Lund 2002a:2). In 2000, the Department of Social Welfare became 
The state had a system of making fathers who leave their partners with children to pay for their 
upbringing, until the age of 18. 
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the Department of Social Development. 
Unlike the apartheid regime, the ANC government viewed the welfare system as 
important in bringing about social development in South Africa. As a way of 
creating an efficient system, one National Department, and several Provincial 
and Local welfare departments, were created. Non-Governmental Organizations, 
as well as other stakeholders' and partnerships became important mechanisms 
in the implementation of the social welfare policy (Department of Social 
Development, 2002:4). 
The Child Support Grant Policy was introduced in 1998 to replace the SMG and 
was created to redress racial imbalances, also to address the issue of child 
poverty in South Africa (Cassiem & Streak, 2001:24). The CSG started operating 
in late 1999 under the new Department of Social Development. This Grant is not 
restricted to single mothers but can be given to primary care-giver(s) of the child2. 
Eligibility for the Grant is through a means test. 
The strategic plans of the Department of Social Development concerning CSG 
were to ensure the registration and payment of grants to all eligible applicants. 
They planned to do this by increasing the reach of CSG. The Department's target 
was to reach three million children by 2003. In 2004 the target was 3.2 million 
and for 2005-2006 the target is six million children (Department of Social 
Development, 2005:4-5). Initially the Child Support Grant was to be given to 
children between birth to seven years of age and the amount was set at R110 
per month. 
Due to the fact that the CSG was not reaching enough children and many 
vulnerable children between the ages of eight and eighteen were still not covered 
by this grant, the Department had to extend the age of eligibility for the CSG. In 
4. A primary care-giver can be a parent, grandparent, or anyone who is mainly responsible for looking after 
the child. 
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2003 the first extension was from seven to nine years old and the amount was 
increased from R110 to R160. Since then each year the amount has increased. It 
is now (2005) R180 per month and the age has been extended to 14 years 
(Hunter, 2003:20). 
2.3. Policy Framework 
The CSG has been implemented through a top-down mode of implementation. 
The Department of Social Development has one national and several provincial 
and local departments. These three spheres are supposed to function in a 
holistic manner, where the national department provides funding to the Provinces 
to implement. Local authorities have to do the actual administration of the Grant 
(Department of Social Development 1997:6-7). 
The National Department of Social Development is responsible for allocating the 
budgets to the provincial departments. This provision of financial resources is to 
ensure that implementation takes place. However, they are also mandated by the 
Welfare Policy Guidelines to offer administrative support to the Provincial 
Department on projects and policy implementation (Department of Social 
Development 1997:20-23) 
Provincial Departments are tasked with the planning, implementing and co-
ordination of the CSG, according to the national standards. This entails ensuring 
uniform implementation of the Grant in all provinces, to formulate, co-ordinate, 
review and administer social welfare within the framework of the national policy. 
The provincial departments then delegate this function of implementation to the 
District Offices (Department of Social Development 1997:15). 
Local government (District level) is responsible for performing those welfare 
functions that have been decentralized to them by the provincial office. What this 
means is that the provincial department has authority to delegate welfare 
functions, especially with regards to service delivery to local welfare offices 
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(Department of Social Development 1997:25). 
The CSG is awarded to applicants who are eligible. Their eligibility is evaluated 
using different qualifying criteria. These criteria are used as a means for 
government officials to determine the intended target population for the Grant. 
2.4. Grant Administration 
Before money or resources is awarded to applicants, officials have to assess the 
applicants' status, to verify their eligibility. The applicant's eligibility is judged 
using the guidelines specified in a grant. The officials are expected to be efficient 
in the administration of social security, because social security has been created 
to help those in need. Therefore the process should not take too much time; 
because people are in need of the grants (Gerbers 2001:217). When there are 
changes in the processes they need to be well communicated, to ensure that the 
payment to beneficiaries continues as planned (Gerbers 2001:217). 
As a means of ensuring that the CSG reaches the eligible child, the grant is given 
to a primary care-giver. The CSG is payable through a means test which tests 
the eligibility of the applicant. This means test requires for people living in rural 
areas not to earn above R1 100 per month or R13 200 per year. If the applicant 
stays in an urban area, but lives in an informal settlement, they should not earn 
more than R1 100 per month or R13 200 per year (Department of Social 
Department 2004:2-5). 
The means test serves as a basis for the Department of Social Development's 
officials to judge the applicant's eligibility for receiving the grant. Apart from 
income, there are other factors that government officials have to consider in 
terms of eligibility. The age of the child applying for the Grant has to be verified 
beforehand. Before the extension of the CSG to children up to the age of 14 
years, the age restriction was up to the age of seven years (Department of Social 
Development 2004:3). In 2002, children under the age of nine years qualified for 
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the CSG. From 2004, children below the age of 11 years also became eligible for 
the Grant. As of 2005 children below the age of 14 years became eligible for the 
CSG (Department of Social Development 2004:2). 
Another requirement is that an applicant should be a South African citizen and 
should reside in South Africa. The care-giver should be in possession of a 13 
digit, bar-coded Identity document and the child should have a bar-coded birth 
certificate which is obtainable from Home Affairs offices. However, as from 2004, 
as a result of a Constitutional ruling, permanent residents are also eligible for the 
Grant (Leatt 2001:7). 
A care-giver cannot apply for more than six non-biological children. A child will 
not receive the CSG if the care-giver is not South African, or if they receive child 
maintenance (from the father) for the child or children concerned. This means 
that anyone who gives birth while in South Africa is not eligible for the Grant if 
they don't fit the requirements. The administration of this Grant has to proceed in 
a prescribed manner, as per requirement of the policy (Department of Social 
Development 2004:3). 
The CSG has to be awarded in compliance with the guidelines to eligibility. 
Government officials are not expected to process any application that falls 
outside the prescribed requirements. The specification of age serves as means 
by government to create boundaries for the target group. The target population is 
specified through geographical criteria (only South African citizens in 2000-2004), 
age (no children above 11 years) and income levels (through a means test). 
However, in 2005 people with permanent residence in South Africa were also 
eligible for the grant. 
The implementation of the CSG plays a critical role in ensuring that the intended 
target population is able to access the grant. Therefore, using the eligibility 
criteria is an important way to administer the CSG. Stipulated guidelines spell out 
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the process that the officials responsible for administering the CSG need to 
follow. These guidelines are a means through which government ensures the 
uniform implementation of the Grant throughout South Africa. 
2.4.1. Department of Social Development Application Process 
In the policy process the target population can be reached through the 
implementation of the policy or programme and the manner in which the policy is 
implemented can determine whether the target population would be reached or 
not. The policy has to design an appropriate delivery system to ensure for the 
effective and efficient delivery of the program or policy at hand (Rossi & Freeman 
1989:139). 
During policy or programme implementation the implementers have to ensure 
uniform delivery in all the relevant areas. A uniform delivery system ensures that 
there is no variation in implementation which might compromise the policy and 
lead to the target population not being reached. The context might be different, 
but the services provided have to be uniform for all the areas, to ensure that the 
intervention addresses the problem it is meant to address, in areas of need 
(Rossi & Freeman 1989:139). 
As a means of administering the CSG, the Department of Social Development 
outlined a process to be followed by officials when implementing the Child 
Support Grant. All social security grants have to be implemented uniformly; there 
is a set procedure that has to be followed. Specifications for administration differ 
according to the grants (Gerbers 2001:214) The registration process for the 
Child Support Grant are: 
• Local welfare offices handle applications for the CSG. This enables 
services to be brought closer to people. 
• In instances where a primary care-giver is not well, or too old, another 
family member or friend can apply on their behalf. 
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• Home Affairs officials should assist the applicants in filling out the 
application form. 
• A receipt has to be issued to the applicant as proof of application; this is 
used for paybacks, where necessary. 
• The receipt must be kept, as it serves as an applicant's only proof of 
application. 
• Government officials should not ask for money for CSG application. 
• If the application is not approved by the Welfare Office, applicants must be 
informed in writing about the reasons their application was not approved 
(Department of Social Development, 2004). 
These guidelines specify the uniformity that has to be employed in the 
administration process, which every official involved in the process of the Child 
Support Grant needs to follow. Since this is a national intervention, all applicants 
should receive the same intervention, throughout. 
Gerbers (2001:215) states that registration is influenced by the scope of 
coverage of that scheme. This means that if the extent of coverage is wide, the 
administration process needs to be capacitated to be able to handle a bigger 
coverage. The bigger the scope of coverage the more reason it has to be 
controlled and monitored strictly, to prevent possible irregularities. 
The registration of applicants is undertaken to provide the DSD with records and 
information on the applicants and also to assist in verifying eligibility. In order for 
the target population to be reached, they have to be registered or rather be 
aware of such intervention which is accessible through registration (Gerbers 
2001:215). There are different modes in which a Grant can be accessed and 
methods of payment differ. 
The system that the DSD uses for capturing information of applicants is called 
Social Pension System (SOCPEN). This system was initially used to administer 
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pensions, and further adapted to include the children's grant. The SOCPEN 
pension administration system was developed, implemented and maintained by 
the former Provincial Administration of Transvaal (PTA) in 1987 (Yako 2001:7). 
The system administered and paid pensions only for a specific population group. 
It was in 1994 that all the Provincial Welfare Departments decided to 
amalgamate the 14 pension payment and administration systems into one 
system. It was decided to make use of the SOCPEN system. The process of 
using SOCPEN started in 1994 and was complited in 1996 (Yako 2001:5). 
The functionality on SOCPEN thus had to be changed to accommodate the 
different payment methods and also accommodate contracts such as the Post 
Office, CPS and All Pay. This system enables the Department to record the age 
of the child, the information of the primary care giver, the date of the first 
application, results of the application and all the information about the applicant. 
This information has to be updated regularly, to ensure that proper 
implementation takes place (Hunter 2003:14). 
2.4.2. Methods of receipt of the CSG 
Grants are paid out through cash payments by private contractors appointed by 
the government, through bank deposits, post offices and institutions. According 
to the intergovernmental fiscal review, it costs the government about R30.14 per 
person to administer any grant (in KZN); this is regardless of the value of the 
grant (Hunter 2003:5). Even though there are different modes of payment of the 
grant, most recipients still use the cash payment method; this is so because 
beneficiaries try to avoid bank or other charges (Department of Social 
Development 2005:7). The target population has to be identified in order to 
ensure that the intervention reaches the people targeted. 
11 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
3.1. Policy 
Policy is better known as the course of action utilized and followed by a 
government, party or ruler. This course of action can either be an advantageous 
or measurerable course of action (Hill 1997:6). In his definition Friend (1974:40) 
defines policy as essentially a stance which one articulates, that contributes to 
the context within which a succession of future decisions would be made. A 
policy allows for goals and objectives on social issues to be concentrated on. 
These goals and objectives are backed up by legislation. 
Helco (1972:85) defines policy as a course of action or inaction, rather than 
specific decisions or actions; policy is not only about making decisions but also 
about indecision by a government, party or ruler. In his definition he stresses that 
indecision also forms part of policy. This legitimizes the government's choice of 
non-decision as a decision in itself, thus concluding that indecision is tantamount 
to decision-making, because this reflects a stance taken. 
In essence, policy involves a course of action or a web of decisions, rather than 
one. Hill (1997:7), however, in his definition differs and argues that policy often 
develops around the implementation phase rather than the policy-making phase 
in the policy process. This is because the implementation phase determines the 
feasibility of the policy goals to be attained. Implementation also informs 
decision-making for policy formulation (Hill 1997:7). 
Public policy can be defined as a relationship between governmental unit(s) and 
its environmental setting. Howlett & Ramesh (1995:4) view this as a description 
of what the government intends to do and not to do. Most often, public policies 
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are developed by government bodies and officials. They are designed to 
accomplish specific goals and results that are needed by their environment. 
These have a course of action that the government intends to take over a period 
of time. James & Anderson (1997:10) agree with Hill (1997:7) that a policy does 
not only include the decision to adopt the law or make the rule on issues but 
influences decisions with regards to the implementation of the law (James & 
Anderson 1997:10). The nature and dynamics of policy implementation therefore 
needs to be explored. 
3.2. Implementing Public Policy 
The manner in which a policy is implemented plays an important role in 
determining whether such policy has a chance of success or not. Pressman & 
Wildavsky (1973, in Hill & Hupe 2002:45), define policy implementation as "a 
process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to 
achieving them". A policy contains goals and ways of achieving them. The 
implementation process is a tool used to achieve the desired goals by the policy, 
through practice. According to Pressman & Wildavsky (1973 in Hill & Hupe 
2002:45), policy implementation depends on a number of links involved in the 
implementation "chain". These links vary from financial support, constituency 
building and the interpretation of the policy by the implementers. 
Pressman & Wildavsky (1973 in Hill & Hupe 2002:45) argue that in order to 
achieve favourable outcomes from the policy, certain conditions need to be met, 
for instance clear objectives have to be established, commitment of adequate 
resources, clear channels of communication and personnel responsible for 
managing resources need to be clarified. Once all this is determined, then the 
policy stands a chance of being implemented properly. 
It is crucial to note that a series of logical steps followed does not guarantee the 
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achievement of the desired outcome of the implementation. Policy 
implementation does not progress from intention, through decision, to action 
(Barrett & Fudge 1981:10). However, actions should remain at the centre 
throughout the policy process. Most often, new policies are created and fitted into 
the old system. This system is then expected to implement the policy in a manner 
in which the new government operates and plans need to be put in place for it to 
be implemented. This is better understood as organizational structure 
modification, which entails fitting a new policy into the old organizational structure 
or if necessary creating a new one. This ensures a better suited environment for 
the policy's success, when implemented (Hill & Hupe 2002:60-80). 
This is a complex but important task, because government officials (street-level 
bureaucrats) can refuse to implement the new policy. Their refusal can be overt 
or covert. They can use delaying tactics to indirectly delay the implementation of 
the policy at hand. Sometimes they can direct their problems to their superiors, 
namely about the policy being unsuitable for their work environment. Their 
refusal could be for different reasons. One reason might be because the loyalty 
they had to the old system or because the new policy will confuse or destroy the 
routine they had established. Consequently, street-level bureaucrats usually 
create their own routines to manage their work better; therefore these rules 
become "new policy" (are treated as policy) as a means devised for their coping 
mechanisms (Hill & Hupe 2002:60-80). 
The final task in policy implementation is monitoring policy impact; if the policy is 
successful its impact should be visible one way or the other. This means that the 
impact can either be positive or negative. However, because the policy reforms 
are usually long-term the impact of the policy might sometimes not be 
immediately clearly visible (Brinkerhoff & Crosby 2002:45-60). Monitoring is 
continuously done throughout and, as the implementation continues, street-level 
bureaucrats reformulate policies to better suit the environment and the 
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reformulation can only be done if monitoring of policy takes place consistently 
throughout the implementation process or period (Exworthy & Powell 2004:34-
50). Weimer and Vining (2005:275) state that there are certain factors that affect 
success or failure of policy implementation. They include logic of the policy, 
assembly of the policy and the availability of "fixers" to manage assembly. 
Logic of the policy 
This aspect looks at the theory that underlies the link between the policy and 
intended outcomes. The characteristics of the policy and circumstances around 
its adoption will influence whether the policy succeeds or not. The theory 
underlying the policy must be examined to see if it is suitable to be used for the 
policy concerned. More often a policy is formulated under the assumption of a 
theory that works in one context but will not automatically work in another 
context. This affects the logic of the policy, because contextual aspects affect the 
implementation of policy (Weimer & Vining 2005:275). 
Assembly of the policy 
In the implementation process, essential elements have to be assembled. One 
of these essential elements is resources. The securing of resources can 
sometimes become a political issue. Those that are more likely to gain enough 
resources usually have political influence. This is why it is important during 
constituency building to involve those people with political influence in the 
constituencies (Weimer & Vining 2005:276). 
Availability of "fixers" to manage assembly 
The fixers are those people who intervene in the policy implementation process 
during the assembly phase. They help implementers to gain needed resources 
that have been withheld due to politics surrounding a particular policy. Fixers can 
be people from an interest group who are in favour of the policy, or local 
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administrators. Fixers have political or personal connections with the people 
withholding resources. Due to their political advantage their involvement can 
determine if the policy will gather adequate resources needed for its 
implementation (Weimer & Vining 2005:278-279). Once the above have been 
established, monitoring and evaluation helps to direct the "fixers" to the roots of 
the problem. 
3.3. Modes of Implementation 
Policy implementation can take a top-down or a bottom-up approach. These two 
different modes of implementation Hill & Hupe (2002:48) views as the ultimate 
methods in which policies are implemented in the public sphere. 
3.3.1. Top-down Approach 
The top-down approach is a form of authoritative policy decision-making, which 
imposes the implementation of policy on subordinates. It focuses on power and 
fat policy being implemented by the top level of government (Hill & Hupe 
2002:48). Their implementation, however, does not involve actual work, but 
transfer of authority and functions to the subordinates for grassroot 
implementation. The top-down approach is, in essence, an implementation 
strategy which is characterized by government officials making and implementing 
policy that affects citizens. It does not consider the participation or involvement of 
the citizens in the policy-making or implementation process. 
The top-down approach involves a transfer of instructions to the lower levels 
without authority to change or take decisions on implementation (Anderson 1994: 
215-216).This model is mostly involved in planning, control and hierarchical 
transfer of instructions to subordinates (often these are street level bureaucrats). 
The planning the "top downers" are involved in relates to the method of 
implementation to be used. What is involved here is finding out possible methods 
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that best suits the policy at hand and then comparing it with other similar 
implemented policies. Once the policy implementation method is created, it is 
tested to verify its competency to the policy at hand; this is mostly employed 
using a forward mapping model (Hill & Hupe 2002:175). 
Forward mapping 
This is a way top-downers, as Hill & Hupe (2002:176) call them, utilize to ensure 
that the implementation process is properly planned. Forward mapping looks at 
the specification of the chain of behaviours that link policy to a desired outcome. 
This involves specifying what must be done and by whom, in order to reach the 
intended outcome (Weimer & Vining 2005:281). 
In forward mapping a person planning and designing an implementation should 
consider how policy implementers will behave and how their behaviour can be 
influenced. In this way the policy implementer has to predict what could go wrong 
and formulate means to counteract that (Weimer & Vining 2005:282). With 
regards to control, the top downers exert control over the policy and procedures 
involved in policy implementation. They dictate measures to be undertaken and 
they expect the policy implementers to follow instructions specified in the policy 
(Hill & Hupe 1994:175). 
Hierarchical discipline in the top-down approach is important. The hierarchical 
way gives no authority for lower-level personnel on decision-making, even when 
it concerns their functions. The lower level personnel are expected to report 
using the ladder for all the problems and difficulties they are faced with regarding 
implementation. These could include problems related to the processes to be 
followed (Anderson 1994:216). However, as might be expected, this approach is 
synonymous with time delays and red tape, because of its rigidness which leads 
to unnecessary obstacles to service delivery. 
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The top-down approach to implementation has other shortcomings. The top-
down mode of implementation is said to view implementation as nothing more 
than assembling actions in support of orders and intentions of political 
leaders(Hill & Hupe 2002:174). 
The top-down approach is also concerned with supporting the regime and 
allowing consistent decisions on implementation to be made by political leaders 
(Hill & Hupe 2002:174). This restricts the emergence of policy contributions of 
actors far from the political leaders (Hill & Hupe 2002:174). The regime and the 
ideologies of the political leaders can be viewed as more important than the 
issues on the grounds that arise from implementation. Furthermore, the 
hierarchical structure may result in inefficient service provision or limit the 
potential number of users of the service. This can be done by prolonging 
processes which discourage applicants from accessing the system, because of 
time spent trying to gain access. 
3.3.2. Bottom-up Approach 
This approach focuses on how the policy implementers carry out the policy, 
compared with simply focusing on the instructions they must follow. It is based on 
the lower level and concerns activities of street level bureaucrats (Lipsky 
1980:14-20). The bottom-up approach is more flexible and it focuses more on the 
output than the input. This mode of implementing policy is more concerned with 
the outcome. The flexibility is a result of the manner in which street-level 
bureaucrats conduct their responsibilities (Hill 1997:140). According to Lipsky 
(1980:14-20), street-level bureaucrats are bottom-uppers, they are involved in 




Backward mapping complements the bottom-up approach. Backward mapping 
assists the bottom-up approach model to focus on the behaviour and intervention 
that will lead to change. The best intervention that could alter behaviour is then 
chosen. In the bottom-up approach the people affected by a situation are 
involved in decision-making and they at least get to influence the policy-making 
process (Weimer & Vining 2005:283). With backward mapping one is able to 
start at the end (with the street-level bureaucrats) and trace what led to such 
actions. Backward mapping allows for planners to come up with a number of 
alternatives to choose from in arriving at an outcome. Backward mapping, 
according to Hill & Hupe (2002:56), ensures that street-level bureaucrats' 
methods of implementing policy can change policy. This is why the 
implementation has to be closely monitored. 
3.3.3. Street-level Bureaucrats 
Hill & Hupe (2002:49-50) argue that street-level bureaucrats shape and formulate 
policies, making them conducive to the environment they are dealing with (Hill & 
Hupe 2002:49-50). Street-level bureaucrats work at the lower level of the 
bureaucracy, as delivery-point officials, who interact with their customers or 
clients on a daily basis. They are responsible for implementing policies given to 
them by their superiors. Street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) face two sets of 
constraints: from their senior managers who may demand conformity to rule and 
from the clients or customers (the public that benefits from the policy's results 
and demand adequate service). SLBs may have to use their discretion at times, 
to achieve results. As a result of such pressures they create their own routines to 
cope. These routines are, however, not reflected in the policy document but 
should be considered as policy (Lipsky 1980:14-20, 83). 
As a result of such pressures and also a lack of water-tight policy documents 
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(that spell out every action and step taken), street-level bureaucrats tend to 
create their own patterns of practice that help fill in the gaps and/or use the 
available resources to maximize their efficiency. Since SLBs regularly interact 
with clients they can obtain their clients' compliance over the new procedures 
and contingency plans (Lipsky 1980:83). The manner in which policies are 
implemented by SLBs assist in ensuring that policies are properly implemented 
and thus assist in ensuring good governance and consolidation of democracy in 
South Africa. 
3.4. Good Governance 
Good governance involves among other functions, encouraging public 
participation and to making government more responsive to its electorate 
(Diamond 1999:120). Diamond argues that decentralization helps to consolidate 
democracy. Decentralization is said to achieve this through developing the 
democratic values of citizens, increasing accountability of government, providing 
channels of communication, enhancing checks and balances and allowing for 
parties to exercise their power over government (Diamond 1999:122). Therefore, 
as means of consolidating and developing good governance, decentralization of 
administrative functions to local level is vital. 
3.4.1. Administrative Decentralisation 
Administrative decentralisation is defined as "...the transfer of responsibility for 
planning, management, and the raising and allocation of resources from the 
central government's agencies to subordinate units or level of governments..." 
(Peters 2001:24). 
The decentralisation of administrative duties has largely been adopted by Third 
World countries, especially those that gained freedom/ independence in the late 
1980s (Peters 2001:23). Decentralisation, in this instance, involves the 
devolution of power by the central office to local offices that are seen to be 
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'closer' to the people or situation that is being addressed. The purpose of 
decentralisation of functions is to facilitate a more efficient and effective provision 
of public goods and services. However, decentralisation also serves the political 
motives of legitimising the regime in power through increased participation (this 
also serves to deepen democracy, since the opposition is also involved, to some 
extent, in government and in decision-making) (Peters 2001:24). As means of 
cultivating a culture of good governance it is important for organizations to learn 
skills that will help them solve current as well as future problems. According to 
James (2001:15), organizational development forms part of capacity-building for 
organizations, to equip them to be more strategic in the attainment of the 
organization's goals. 
3.4.2. Organizational Development 
Capacity-building encompasses different strategies that are focused on 
increasing the efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness of government's 
performance (Grindle 1997:5). Efficiency in this context relates to the time and 
resources required to produce a given outcome. Effectiveness refers to the 
appropriateness of efforts undertaken to the production of desired outcomes and 
responsiveness relates to the link between the communication of needs and the 
capacity to address them (Grindle 1997:5). 
To build capacity, gaps in the system need to be identified, so that capacity 
building initiatives are aimed at the areas where problems are observed. When 
referring to capacity-building in an organizational context the emphasis is on 
making human resources better equipped, thereby making the organization 
better equipped. Capacity-building can focus on contextual constraints and/or 
dynamic processes. These two allow for human resource development, 
organizational strengthening and institutional reform to be examined (Grindle 
1997:10). 
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Grindle (1997:12) stresses that it is important for organizations to look into 
capacity strengthening, other than development. She argues that this is so 
because organization capacity-building is used as means of strengthening the 
organization. Most often organizations are faced with needs for capacity 
development. These include human resource and technical development, 
technical. 
Human resource development 
Human resource development involves the supply of professional and technical 
personnel. The development of human resources is an attempt to increase the 
individual's or team's capacity to perform their duties better. Training of 
personnel, increased remuneration and motivating staff tend to lead to better 
performance. The increasing of remuneration is aimed at attracting skilled 
workers and retaining them in the public sector (Grindle 1997:13). However, 
Grindle (1997:65) argues that retaining workers in an organization should not be 
the focus of capacity strengthening. 
Organizational strengthening 
Organizational strengthening forms part of capacity development. Peters 
(2001:85) states that organizations need to be capacitated to ensure that they 
continue to function effectively and efficiently. Strengthening organizations takes 
place through directing resources towards an area of the organization that lacks 
capacity. This includes the purchasing of equipment that assist in better 
performance and creating strategies that work better for the policy or programme 
at hand. Peters (2001:75) emphasizes that most organizations need to have 
capacity to enable them to be more flexible in their functioning (Peters 2001:89). 
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3.5. Monitoring and Evaluation 
Evaluation is viewed as a systematic assessment of a programme or policy, to 
determine the successes and progress of such programme or policy. Evaluation 
can be conducted systematically or informally. Systematic evaluation enables the 
"evaluation to be conducted employing social science research techniques". This 
allows for carefully found outcomes that adjudicate for a thorough and more 
precise way of improving the programme or policy (Weiss, 1998:4). However, 
even though specific rules and procedures are followed in systematic evaluation, 
the subjectivity of the evaluator can shape the outcome of the evaluation 
(Palumbo & Hallet, 1993:11). 
Informal evaluation is usually conducted carelessly and more often leads to 
improper judgement and incorrect decision-making. This is a result of unfounded 
procedures, which are employed as the process of evaluation unfolds. This can 
be explained as groping along, which is also explained as learning the process 
as the policy is implemented (Bardach 1998:42). The informal evaluation method 
is not granted legitimacy because there are no formal procedures followed. 
However Worthan & Fitzpatrick (1997:7) point out that this type of evaluation 
does not occur in a vacuum, that there are organizations that do not always 
evaluate their programmes through formal procedures, but still make legitimate 
and sound judgements (Worthan & Fitzpatrick 1997:6). 
The core concept of evaluation is judgement, using certain measurements to give 
merit to the programme's success rate or its failure and giving possible reasons 
for the outcome. Monitoring allows the organization to redirect the intervention in 
order to achieve intended goals. When evaluating, one reviews the goals and 
objectives of that particular programme or policy and sees if they have been 
achieved and, if not, find reasons for this (Weiss 1998:7). 
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Rossi & Freeman (1989:139) argue that specified goals in policy assist in 
directing the evaluation process. This ensures that capacity development or 
strengthening is directed at the actual problem area. They stress that it is 
important for the problem's targets to be clearly identified, to ensure that the 
policy or programme is addressing the target population it is aimed at. By clearly 
specifying the target boundaries this can help in determining who is to be 
included or excluded by the policy or programme. Specifying the target 
population in detail helps create this boundary of reach and prevents a blurred 
and broad population to be included (Rossi & Freeman 1989: 97). 
Monitoring is very important in the implementation of the policy, because it allows 
for the problems to be addressed before it is too late. Monitoring forms building 
blocks of evaluation, but some writers use the term interchangeably. Rossi & 
Freeman (1989:98) point out that, when monitoring is properly done, it assists in 
redirecting the intervention towards the intended outcome. This is because the 
outcome of the monitoring usually reflects the picture of what is happening with 
the implementation of the policy. 
According to Worthan, Sanders & Fitzpatrick (1997:15), with proper monitoring it 
is possible for policy-developers to create a solution that would counteract the 
problems resulting from the implementation. As Barrette & Fudge (1981:9) states 
every implementation has its accompanying problems. However with proper 
diagnosis of these problems during the evaluation process, they can be easily 
resolved before they become unmanageable. 
In order to employ such theoretical tools in analyzing secondary studies, the 
methodology used to do this is always important, because it can determine the 
success of properly extracting information from the text. 
24 
Chapter 4: Methodology 
4.1. Research method 
This study will use qualitative content analysis of secondary data. Qualitative 
method is the method of study that displays, analyzes, summarizes and 
interprets words and images based on the information (Neuman 2000:87). 
This is an inductive approach of study that put emphasis on insights and 
generalization of data collected. This method of study collects soft type data in 
the form of words and impressions (Neuman 2000:122). 
4.2. Content analysis 
Content analysis is defined as a technique used to gather and analyze the 
content of the text. It is used as a research tool that concentrates on the actual 
content and internal features of media or publications. Content analysis is used 
to establish the presence of certain words, concepts, themes, phrases, 
characters or sentences within texts or sets of texts and to quantify this presence 
in an objective manner( Neuman 2000:292). 
These texts take different forms, from books, book chapters, research papers, 
interviews, discussions, newspaper headlines and articles, historical documents, 
speeches, conversations, advertising, theatre (documentations), informal 
conversation or any type of communication on the subject researched (Neuman 
2000:292). To conduct a content analysis on a text, the text is coded, or broken 
down into manageable categories on a variety of levels; word sense, phrase, 
sentence or theme. It is then analyzed using either a conceptual or a relational 
method of analysis (Berelson 1974:1-7). 
Content analysis enables the researcher to interpret the content in any source of 
communication such as books and articles. "Content analysis allows for studying 
beliefs, organizations, attitudes and human relations" (Neuman 2000:293). 
The present study used content analysis on the findings of other studies to 
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discover the types of problem encountered by government officials when 
implementing the CSG. More specifically, the study coded the problems 
thematically (from the secondary studies) and critically analysed them, using 
implementation theory. 
The investigation focused on selected secondary studies which dealt with the 
problems of implementation of the CSG in South Africa between the years 2000 
and 2004. The scope of the study included all nine provinces. The following are 
examples of the secondary sources which were analysed. 
Government /Policy Documents 
1. Department of Social Development. 2002. Strategic Plan 2002/2003-
2004/2005. Pretoria. Government Printer. 
2. Department of Social Development. 1997. White Paper for Social Welfare: 
Pretoria. Government Printer. 
3. Department of Public Administration. 2000. Batho Pele: A Better Life for 
All South Africans Putting People First, http://www.dpsa.qov.za/batho-
pele/about.html (Accessed on 25 November 2005). 
4. South Africa. Social Assistance Act no 59, 1992. 
5. Department of Social Development. 2004. Progress Report on 
Implementation Looking at Problems Encountered by the Department and 
the solutions made. Pretoria. Government Printer. 
6. Department of Social Development, 2003. Fact Sheet: Social Grants 
Beneficiaries. Pretoria. Government Printer. 
7. Department of Social Development. 2003. Service Delivery-Grants-
children. 
http://www.socdev.ecprov.qov.za/services service deliverv/qrants/childre 
n.html (Accessed on December 2005). 
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Media Releases 
1. Department of Social Development. 2004. Media Statement by Minister for 
Social Development, Dr Zola Skweyiya, to announce the anti-fraud, anti 
corruption and maladministration campaign, including a call to those not 
eligible but receiving social grants, to come out and be considered for 
indemnity. Pretoria. South Africa. 
http://www.info.qov.za/speeches/2004/04121316151007.htm (Accessed 
on 18 July 2005). 
2. Department of Social Development. 2003. Statement by the Minister of 
Social Development, Dr Zola Skweyiya, at press conference on the 3 
million children registered for the Child Support Grant. Pretoria South 
Africa, http://www.info.qov.za/speeches/2003/03071812461001.htm 
(Accessed on 20 July 2005). 
Published studies 
1. Goldblatt, B. 2004. Gender and Social Security Seminar: The Rights to 
Social Assistance and Gender: A Study of Implementation of the Child 
Support Grant. Heinrich Boll Foundation. Johannessburg. South Africa. 
2. Hunter, N. 2004. Welfare Grant Administration in KwaZulu-Natal: Looking 
at the Child Support Grant. Durban. School of Development 
Studies.http://www.ukzn.ac.za/csds/Publications/rr62.pdf (Accessed on 15 
June 2005). 
3. Leatt, A. 2003. Reaching out to Children: An Analysis of the First Six 
Months of the Extension of the Child Support Grant in South Africa. 
Children's Institute. Cape Town. 
4. Mvulane, Z. & Rosa, S. 2003. Delays are Causing Costly Confusion. 
Children First. Journal. Vol.7 (49): pp6-7. Durban. 
5. Ngwenya, N.G. 2003. An Evaluation of the Implementation of the Child 
Support Grant Programme in Mpumalanga Province: A Case Study of the 
Daggakraal Community. (Unpublished thesis). 
6. Rosa, S. & Meintjies, H. 2004. The Case for Universal Support. Children 
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First. Journal. Vol 8 (58): pp57-59. Durban. 
7. Rosa S. & Mpokotho, C. 2004. Extension of the Child Support Grant to 
Children under 14 years; Monitoring Report, Alliance for Children 
Entitlement to Social Security (ACESS). Plumstead. 
28 
Chapter 5: Findings and Analysis 
Introduction 
According to Exworthy and Powell (2004:246) an ideal implementation is said to 
be a product of unitary organizations, with clear lines of authority, like that of an 
army. They agree with Pressman & Wildavsky's idea (1973 in Barrett & Fudge 
1981:254) of implementation involving a chain of command and that the links are 
imperative to ensure proper implementation. This means that, in a chain, if one 
linkage is not performing well, it impacts on the implementation process. 
With regards to the CSG, this policy is implemented following the top-down 
mode, as conceptualized by Hill & Hupe (2002:254). The findings illustrate that 
the manner in which this policy is implemented creates numerous problems, 
which has resulted in ineffective and inefficient implementation which is related to 
the use of this top-down approach. 
The policy was later extended to children up to the age of 14 years. However, 
this extension was not coupled with increased capacity, to ensure that the 
system could efficiently deliver. This was mainly due to a lack of organizational 
capacity development. 
The importance of continuous monitoring and evaluation of the Grant was 
overlooked. This created problems of maladministration, loopholes in the system 
and improper practice, all of which impinged on access to the Grant by 
beneficiaries. Empirical evidence of all these problems is found in the secondary 
studies and they reveal the dangers of the Government using the top-down mode 
of implementation. 
5.1. Top-down Implementation 
According to Hill & Hupe (2002:48), the top-down approach is a form of 
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authoritative policy decision-making, which imposes the implementation of policy 
on subordinates. It concentrates power at the top and at policy being 
implemented by the top level of government. In South Africa there is a 
delegation of functions with regards to policy on social grants from national to 
provincial and by provincial government to local government (Department of 
Social Development 1997). It is argued that, among other benefits, this 
delegation helps to empower local communities. However, it has also been 
pointed out that legislation by itself is insufficient to address social problems. 
Grootboom stated that "mere legislation is not enough. The state is obliged to act 
to achieve the intended result and the legislative measures will inevitably have to 
be supported by appropriate, well directed policies and programmes 
implemented by executive" (Rosa & Mphokotho 2004:8). 
This allocation of authority by national government does not specify the type of 
authority that is given to the local authorities with regards to decision-making 
when encountering problems. This lack of dissemination of real authority and 
information to local level leads to problems of incorrect interpretation of the 
information, which affects effective implementation. In examining the chain of 
command of the CSG, the problems of the top-down mode were evident. 
5.1. 2. Chain of Command 
Pressman & Wildavsky (in Hill & Hupe 2002:89), argue that implementation has 
to occur in a manner where all links in the chain work together. The chain of 
command refers to the links involved in the implementation process. According to 
Lipsky (1980:14-20), street-level bureaucrats are people who work at the lower 
level of the organization; they interact with their customers or clients on a daily 
basis. They are responsible for implementing policies given to them by their 
superiors. Government structures in South Africa operate in a manner that 
enables all three spheres (national, provincial and local) to work as one entity. 
Each sphere is granted different responsibilities and authority to fulfil their 
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functions. The main objective for these different spheres of government is to 
meet the national objectives; this means that anything that is not in line with the 
national goals is not to be implemented (Department of Social Development 
1997:23). 
The National Department of Social Development gives a mandate to the 
provincial departments to perform functions that are in line with the goals of the 
National Department. The provinces then disseminate instructions to regional 
offices, who inform district offices on the processes to be followed (Department of 
Social Development 1997:15). 
The White Paper for Social Welfare (Department of Social Development 
1997:23) states that "The National Department is responsible for national norms 
and standards for rendering services and for ensuring uniformity in the 
application of particular functions is maintained" and, according to the 
Department's reports, "The Department is responsible for: the drafting of policies 
and legislation to achieve the strategic goals set by the Minister for social 
development sector" (Department of Social Development 2004:1). 
This delegation of authority enables the provincial government to delegate some 
of its functions to the local level (district offices) for implementation. The main 
function of the provincial government is to work in conjunction with the national 
government in policy planning, development and implementation. 
According to the White Paper the Provincial Government is responsible 
"...concurrently with the National Department, for planning, development and 
rendering services" 
"...to determine and review policy and to conduct integrated welfare and 
development planning which will be implemented interprovincially, intersectorally 
and in collaboration with the RDP (Redistributive Development Programmes)" 
(Department of Social Development 1997:23). 
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This delegation of functions to the provincial government leaves the local 
government with the functions of offering support to the implementation process 
that is by bringing "government3" to the people. The reason for the formation of 
such structures was to empower the public by bringing (as part of consolidating 
democracy) government to them (Department of Social Development 1997:23). It 
has been stated by the government that: 
"The Government is committed to the decentralization of the social welfare 
services delivery system" and that 
"The Department of Welfare will develop a strategy for the delivery of services at 
local government level in consultation with the stakeholders" (Department of 
Social Development 1997:24). 
This means that the local government (district level) is responsible for performing 
those welfare functions such as service delivery that have been decentralized to 
them by the regional office. The provincial department has authority to delegate 
welfare (implementation) functions, especially with regards to service delivery to 
local welfare offices (Department of Social Development 1997:25). 
The delegation of different functions to different levels has led to problems in the 
implementation of the CSG. These problems were mostly experienced at the 
provincial and local (district) level of governance. 
In a 2004 study on CSG in Gauteng and the North West Provinces by Goldblatt it 
was found that government officials in the district offices asked the applicants 
applying for CSG to provide documents that were not required by law, such as 
clinic cards. According to Social Development's requirements, these clinic cards 
no longer form part of requirements but a 13 digit bar-coded birth certificate does. 
'Government meaning all the services they need and interacting with the government institution at the local 
level, in their districts, municipalities, towns, without having to go to a national office. 
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As a result, many people, especially farm workers in the North West Province, 
could not access the grant because they had no access to clinics (Goldblatt 
2004:47). 
In her study, Goldblatt (2004:43) reported that "Clinic cards are no longer the 
requirement for a grant application yet officials believe that they are essential" 
"Applicants are often sent, unnecessarily to police station to swear to affidavits..." 
The dissemination of incorrect information to applicants could be a consequence 
of the long chain of command, as any amendment to the procedures to be 
followed needs to be communicated to provincial then district offices. At times 
these changes are not properly understood or communicated. The district 
personnel then exercise their own discretion, or include additional information or 
requirements that are not required by law. This changing of procedures is a result 
of incorrect information disseminated to district offices, leading to the 
fragmentation of the policy (Lipsky 1980:75). According to Lipsky (1980:75), the 
manner in which policy is implemented using a chain of command can lead to 
policy fragmentation. This results from the changes that occur at the lower levels 
of the organizations in pursuit of a response to unclear commands. 
Another obstacle noted in the present study was that CSG applicants were 
required to produce a letter of proof of residence. In rural areas in the North West 
a person had to go to local Chiefs to ask for such a letter and if they owed the 
Chief payments for taxes or other contributions this letter was withheld from 
them. Such procedures prevented people from accessing the CSG. Proof of 
residence is not a requirement for accessing the CSG (Goldblatt 2004:48). 
In the Gauteng Province applicants were asked to provide a letter as proof that 
they had attempted to gain maintenance from the father but failed. This is 
however not a prerequisite for receiving the CSG but government officials still 
require such documents before completing an application. 
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Goldblatt (2004:49) reported that "In Gauteng the officials asked for applicants to 
produce proof that they had attempted to get maintenance from the father of the 
child before they could apply for the Child Support Grant. This referral meant 
money had to be paid for private maintenance claims, and this process is time 
consuming. The referral procedure showed the lack of coordination between 
government departments involved in the Child Support Grant application" 
(Goldblatt 2004:49). 
At times these delaying tactics are utilised by District offices to buy time to enable 
them to confirm procedures. In research in provinces such as Mpumalanga, 
Limpopo, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, conducted by Mvulane & Rosa in 
2003, children who were eight but under the age of nine were turned away. The 
information provided to applicants was that only children under the age of 8 
qualified for the grant in 2003 (Mvulane & Rosa 2003:6) 
Rosa & Mvulane (2003:6) reported that "An eight years-four-months old Sibusiso 
Mahlangu qualifies for the Child Support Grant as amended this year (2003), 
however Sibusiso's mother has been turned away several times by officials in 
Odi in the Mabopane, who say he will only qualify for the Child Support Grant in 
1 April 2004" ( Mvulane & Rosa 2003:6). 
Lipsky (1980:83) argues that this interpretation and formation of different rules 
that are not consistent with the national protocol of administration is a way 
created by street-level bureaucrats to cope with the pressures they are faced 
with (Lipsky 1980:83). The misinterpretation is due to lack of understanding of 
information by street-level bureaucrats and as a result they formulate their own 
rules. 
Another problem which results from the long chain of command is that there is 
often duplication of functions by the national and provincial governments. This 
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leads to confusion by the public about who has correct information and who to 
report to when a problem related to implementation arises. Sometimes local 
authorities who are given instructions to follow are faced with the problem of 
interpretation or confirming what must be done. In the case of the age criterion, 
the Minister of Social Development announced in 2003 that children under nine 
would qualify for the Grant. However, when it came to implementation some 
Provincial officials only accepted children under eight years old. 
As Mvulane & Rosa (2003:6) reported, "the Minister of Social Development, Dr 
Zola Skweyiya... in March[2003]...made a firm commitment that as from the 1st 
of April (2003) children under 9 years of age, who are eligible in terms of the 
regulations, will be registered to receive the Child Support Grant until their 14th 
birthday" (Mvulane & Rosa 2003:6). 
Rosa & Mpokotho (2003:20) stated that "despite the fact that the new regulations 
were clear and directives issued in provinces to apply the new law-according to 
the National Department- certain provinces continued to issue information that 
stated that only children under eight years qualified for the CSG" (Rosa & 
Mpokotho 2003:20) and that "the confusion around the implementation of the 
extension of the CSG was also fuelled by misinformation supplied by some 
Provincial Departments of Social Development..." (Rosa & Mpokotho 2004:20). 
The situation in reality has been that these chains of command (from national to 
provincial to local level) are not as effective as they are supposed to be, because 
the manner in which the structures function is not holistic. The local level is 
usually left out of the decision making process. According to Barrette & Fudge 
(1981:3), government seems to be adept at making statements of intent, without 
proper implementation of the actual situation. This means that they are unable to 
put their plans into action. 
The creation of a chain of a command has been used to establish a theoretical 
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framework for government. This process, however, often undermines the attempt 
by government, because it leads to inefficient and ineffective policy 
implementation. Barrette & Fudge (1981:4) argue that government through its 
operation attempts to influence control more than it has the means to do so. 
The holistic (all three spheres working as one towards the same objectives) 
manner in which the government tries to accomplish its chain of command is not 
clear, if it exists at all. These problems affect the sphere that, most of the time, 
does not have answers to the problems they face when implementing the CSG. 
Street-level bureaucrats can also act contrary to the attempts by the South 
African government to ensure good governance for its citizens. 
5.1.3. Street-level bureaucrats 
The term "Street level bureaucrats" refers to the professionals who work at the 
lowest level of an organization. They are responsible for the implementation of 
policies (Lipsky 1980:3). Lipsky (1980:13) points out that street-level bureaucrats 
can formulate policies through their use of routines to simplify their work. With 
regards to the CSG, the problems that made accessing the CSG difficult for 
applicants included lack of information about grants, inability to access birth 
certificates and ID documents from the Department of Home Affairs and 
inefficient and corrupt welfare officials (Goldblatt 2004:47). 
The Minister of Department of Social Development reported that "...we are now 
aware of that there are indeed thousands of people who are not eligible in terms 
of age in receiving the grant but are doing so" (Department of Social 
Development 2005:3). 
Research carried out by Hunter in 2004 in KwaZulu-Natal revealed that, in the 
Inanda area, government officials had reserved certain days in the week for grant 
application because of the increased number of applicants for the CSG. This led 
to applicants being turned away on the days that the officials in this area had not 
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allocated for CSG applications. However, the procedures set out in the policy 
state that the officials are required to administer the Grant every day of the week 
(Hunter 2004:16). 
The Minister of Social Development, Dr. Zola Skweyiya, acknowledged that there 
is uncontrollable maladministration by government officials in relation to the CSG 
(Department of Social Development 2005:4). He stated that in some areas 
(government) welfare officials engage in improper implementation of the CSG. 
This maladministration of the Grant has also taken the form of fraud and 
corruption. 
Hunter (2004:19) reported that "...in rural areas in KwaZulu-Natal ...at some 
welfare district offices where the applicants have to pay a cut of their grant to 
welfare officials once received,...community leaders who write letters or affidavits 
for grant application also demand payments fordoing so" (Hunter 2004:19). 
In her study in the Daggaskraal in Mpumalanga Province in 2003 a member of 
the pension committee reported that "/ was shocked when the representative 
from the centre told me that applicants have to pay for application forms". 
"People... complain that they are unable to apply for the grant because they have 
to pay money to the committee or the officials before they could have their 
application processed' (F7- pension committee member in Ngwenya 2003:51). 
The Department of Social Development's guidelines clearly specify that 
applications for the Grant are free. Requesting money from applicants thus 
constitutes improper conduct on the part of government officials. The only 
requirement is a 13 digit bar-coded identity document and a birth certificate for 
the child (Department of Social Development 2004:3). 
Another problem experienced by applicants related to the prejudice of officials. 
In the study by Goldblatt (2004:47), it was found that one official said he could 
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not assist younger applicants because he believed that they got pregnant 
deliberately to receive the Grant. There are many other beliefs held by 
government officials that serve as an obstacle to effective target participation. 
Goldblatt (2004:47) reported that government officials "only assisted old women 
to access certain documents needed for applying, but not young women, 
because they wasted the Child Support Grant" (Goldblatt 2004:47). 
Street-level bureaucrats thus implement policies in a manner that they think is 
suitable and will help them cope with their workload. Street-level bureaucrats 
create routines and gain their clients' compliance and this is why they introduce 
new rules and regulations (Lipsky 1980:84-87). 
In trying to cope with the complexity of their work, street-level bureaucrats create 
routines and simplify their work, which they do in order to develop responses to 
the information that they have received and processed. These routines are 
created to make tasks manageable and these end up being the organization's 
policy (Lipsky, 1980:84-87). 
The CSG was implemented to assist in reducing poverty in South Africa as a 
whole. The target of the DSD is national; the policy has to be implemented in the 
same way from the Western Cape to Gauteng Province. However, in practice, 
the contrary has been experienced. Each province has altered the manner in 
which the policy is implemented. This means that the policy is fragmented and 
the intervention received no longer resembles the intended one. According to Hill 
& Hupe (2002:49-50), street-level bureaucrats shape and formulate policies, 
making them suitable for the environment they are supposed to be implemented 
in. This changing of policy fragments the initial policy. This fragmentation can 
become a tool to eliminate some people who are part of the target population, 
thus affecting the impact intended by the policy. 
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In the Gauteng province it was found that the Gauteng Provincial government 
had instituted a requirement that applicants had to bring their children with them 
to the offices, when applying for the CSG. This change was initiated in 2003, 
after years of the grant being implemented without asking applicants to bring 
their children. The interesting factor here is that presenting the child at the offices 
does not necessarily prove that that child is yours. The "baby borrowing" problem 
then arose (Goldblatt 2003:52). (This "baby- borrowing" is done through changing 
the outfits of the child and using different care-givers.) 
Mbambo (2005) reported that "one woman comes with her baby and rents her 
baby for a couple of hours, to people who are around....". " She charges them 
money upfront, and the outfits are for changing the sex of the baby for different 
mothers or caregivers" (Mbambo 2005:35). 
Provisions of a legislative framework are to prevent such misconduct. This 
gaining of compliance is not as abstract as it sounds. It is enforced through 
creating rules and procedures that applicants are required to abide by, in order to 
gain assistance. Applicants do not have a say as to whether they agree or not, 
but they have to oblige if they need assistance (Lipsky 1980:25). 
As a result, SLB's (street-level bureaucrats') clients agree to adhere to such 
requirements. By doing this the officials create ways of coping with the load of 
people accessing the CSG. Such conduct is improper policy implementation, 
which often leads to ineffective and inefficient officials (Lipsky 1980:84-87). 
The critical issue, however, is what happens to the policy as a result of 
successive refinement and translation. This changing of rules and gaining 
compliance, while implementing different procedures to those stipulated changes 
the policy and the extent to which details of legislative, administration procedural 
processes reflect or relate to the original intentions. 
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The question of what is being implemented becomes an area of concern. If what 
is implemented is different to the intentions of the original policy, is that good or 
bad? Sometimes changing the implementation model to show the flexibility of the 
policy, in order for the policy to fit local circumstances is bad. This is because the 
original policy goals have been distorted in the process (Barrett & Fudge 
1981:18). 
To ensure that street-level bureaucrats do not fragment policy, monitoring and 
evaluation can be done, to ensure effectiveness and efficiency in implementation. 
5. 2. Good Governance 
According to Grindle (1997:7) creating good governance and co-operative 
government is what many countries strive to achieve. This includes being 
democratic, responsive to the public's needs and, most importantly, delivering 
services to the public as efficiently and effectively as possible. Even though the 
South African Government has created programmes and projects to ensure that 
its citizens enjoy the benefits of good governance, the system is still faced with 
various problems. These problems usually result in poor policy implementation 
and accountability. 
Poor implementation does not only result in the fragmentation of legislation, but 
also creates more problems that affect the uptake of the CSG. The 
consequences of this chain of command go beyond governmental lines. It affects 
the very same people that the intervention is formulated to assist. 
Local government in South Africa plays an important role in the implementation 
of CSG policy. Local government is directly involved in putting policy into 
practice. The National Department has had limited communication with local 
government. This limited interaction leaves the local government with little or no 
power to participate in the reformulation of the policy. Local government is often 
given instructions about the changes made to the policy but not how these 
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decisions were made (Mvulane 2003:6-7). 
According to Cohen & Peterson (1999:21), decentralisation of functions with 
authority allows for all spheres of government to work together effectively. This 
means that Local Government gets involved in the decision-making process; they 
are not only tasked with implementation. This then limits misinterpretation of 
instructions, thus leading to proper execution of instructions. In order to ensure 
that local government does not reject the changes in policy, they need to be 
granted some authority to be able to contribute to policy reformation. There is a 
danger in excluding local government from decision-making, because local 
government can affect the manner in which policy is implemented (Diamond 
1999:161). 
Government's policies are frequently implemented through the top-down mode of 
implementation. This, according to Pressman and Wildavsky (1973:58), involves 
a decision by top officials on the way implementation will take place and the 
issuing of instructions to the subordinates to implement policy. 
The Social Development guideline for service delivery reported that "the grant is 
managed by Social Security Officials in the employment of the Government" 
(Department of Social Development 2005:1) 
The subordinates are expected to follow a hierarchical method of implementing 
policy. They are given specific instructions to follow; when a problem arises they 
have to complain to their superiors, who take the matter upwards until it reaches 
the top level. However, the top-down model does not allow for the implementers 
to make give suggestions or recommendations on solving the problems arising 
from implementation (Hill & Hupe 2002:174). 
According to the ICESCR (International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights), "it is therefore very critical that gaps and shortcomings are 
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identified in order to fulfill the constitutional obligation of delivering services that 
are stipulated by law" (Rosa & Mpokotho 2004:9). 
Hill & Hupe (2002:178) cautioned that it is presumptuous of government officials 
to take decisions on matters that they are detached from. As a result of their 
position, policy planners rely mostly on research, learn about their target 
population. The people who are closely associated with, or located near, the 
target population are not granted enough powers to contribute to decision-
making. The control by the top level, which is not even aware of the conditions 
and processes involved in the local communities, opens gaps for inefficiency in 
implementation planning. Knowledge of the target population, their values and 
their beliefs is important for a proper intervention to be made (Hill & Hupe 
2002:176). 
The national and provincial components can sometimes be useful because they 
can be objective in their decisions. This limits rushed decisions based on a few 
cases only a combination of top-down and bottom-up approach is therefore 
necessary for more efficient policy implementation. These two models 
complement each other, especially in cases like this one that requires both (Hill & 
Hupe 2002:178). 
5.2.1. Bureaucratic Processes 
Social Development officials have experienced difficulties with the system when 
implementing the Child Support Grant. The problems relate to the long 
procedures for processing the CSG. The administration process, in a nutshell, 
entails filling out application forms at the welfare offices. When the application is 
completed, with the assistance of a welfare official, it is handed to the 
administrator to be checked and entered into the database. The applicant is then 
issued with a receipt as proof of application. This allows for paybacks (where 
necessary) caused by bureaucratic delays. With red tape and procedures to be 
followed the application process takes longer than it should (Hunter 2003:65). 
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This long process was described in a study by Hunter (2004): "an applicant's file 
has to follow the applicant and the capturing process for this application cannot 
proceed until the applicant's file is received from this other welfare office- a 
process which can take from two to three months"(Hunter 2003:20) 
Hunter (2003:21) reported further that "after the application is completed it is 
verified by a second attesting officer,...in most offices this happens days after the 
application date,...the application has to be batched together with other 
applicants' files and sent to the regional office for approval, and the time in which 
is to be approved is 14 days from the date of application" (Hunter 2003:21). 
This bureaucratic process prevents flexibility and efficient service delivery. When 
the applicant leaves, the welfare offices are under the assumption that their 
application is queued up for processing. However, this is not always the case. 
The process is long and the tasks could be completed by a few officials, to avoid 
the extended duration the application process takes. The long process makes it 
difficult and creates a backlog in service delivery (Hill 1997:199). 
It is in this context that it is strongly argued that "there also needs to be a 
simplification and reduction in the bureaucracy associated with administration of 
grants" (De Swardt 2003 in Hunter 2003:9). Leatt (2004:7) states "sometimes the 
application takes months before the applicant gets a response to their 
application" (Leatt 2004:7). 
The time spent on processing applications before approval contributes to the 
inefficiency in the administration of the CSG, thus affecting the implementation 
thereof. Many applicants reach the cut-off age while they await approval; this 
then decreases the number of eligible applicants (like Sipho who was eight years 
old in 2003 and was turned away) (Rosa & Mpokotho 2003: 18). Sipho's sister 
reported that "my mother tried to register Sipho for the children's grant early this 
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year. But she was told he (Sipho) does not qualify" (Access 2003:3). 
The Grant application process is then viewed as a futile exercise for government 
officials because they file applications that are more likely to be rejected, 
because of the prolonged process. This, in turn, discourages the officials from 
taking applicants who fall within a certain age group, which is what leads to mal-
administration. However, new processes assist the government officials to cope 
better with the application process (Mvulane 2003:6). 
In one study an applicant stated that "I explained to the officials that on the radio 
they said [Sara] qualifies for the grant. But they [the social worker] insisted that 
she will only qualify next year [2004]" (Mphokotho & Rosa 2003:18). 
Government officials from several offices were found to be practising the same 
"rules". These "rules" were created as means of avoiding processing applications 
that had a chance of being rejected, because of the time consumed by the top-
down process of implementation. Such rules endeavour to ensure efficiency and 
remove the blame or burden of having to explain to applicants why their 
applications were rejected. According to Lipsky (1980:156) street-level 
bureaucrats create new rules to help them cope with their workload, but these 
rules create obstacles to service delivery. 
These rules are communicated through notices "In the office of social services 
there is a sign stating" "only children under eight" 
"Many children who were born in 1994 were turned away in 2003 in many 
offices..."(Rosa & Mpokotho 2004:24). 
Peterson (Peterson in Grindle 1997:161) states that bureaucratic processes are 
mostly utilized in large organizations: government utilizes them to implement its 
policies. The bureaucratic way of implementing policies ensures that there are 
clear line functions. This is then used to bring about order and adherence to 
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processes and rules by government officials (Peterson in Grindle 1997:161). 
With regards to the implementation of the CSG, however, this does not work. 
The bureaucratic process has created additional problems (such as poor service 
delivery) to the ones existing in CSG implementation. This (bureaucratic) system 
is not transparent, instructions from the top are different to those at the local level 
and therefore service delivery is affected (Peterson in Grindle 1997:161). 
According to Peterson (Peterson in Grindle 1997:162) bureaucratic processes 
more often become an obstacle to service delivery, because of their inflexible 
nature and the red tape involved. He argues that if government is to effectively 
implement its policies it should work on trying to make the bureaucratic process 
more flexible. Flexibility will allow for focus and prioritizing service delivery rather 
than a number of people performing a task that could be completed by a few 
people (Peterson in Grindle 1997:162). Apart from the bureaucratic process, 
which remains unchanged and inflexible, there other methods which policy-
formulators should use to counteract the unfriendliness of the system. Weimer & 
Vining (2005:283) state that, in order to have an impact with implementation, it is 
important to first think about the behaviour one wishes to change and find 
suitable intervention to alter behaviour. This is what is called backward mapping. 
5.2.2. Backward Mapping 
Backward mapping is a method mostly utilized by policy-makers to find 
alternative solutions to a problem at hand (Weimer & Vining 2005:283). 
Backward mapping enables the policy-writers to back-track their steps, through 
assessing the behaviour of the public and know where they went wrong, when 
designing an intervention. Most often this insight to the problem can be attained 
through finding out what the problem is and what the needs are, according to the 
target population (Weimer & Vining 2005:284). 
The public's perspectives on the problems concerning the administration of CSG 
were mostly concerned with the process involved in the application process. 
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Information concerning the problems encountered by beneficiaries or target 
populations were gathered by the Children's Institute Call Centre (Rosa & 
Mphokotho 2004:4-6). This Call Centre was operated by the Children's Institute 
(CI). Most of the reports in 2003-2004 included complaints about the extension of 
the Child Support Grant to nine year old children (Rosa & Mphokotho 2004:4-6). 
The complaints ranged from the long process and the complicated nature of the 
phasing-in process, to a lack of understanding of new criteria for the target 
population by both government officials and the public. Through the cases 
reported by officials as well as the public it was evident that there was some 
degree of confusion concerning the process. 
Rosa & Mpokotho (2004:19) reported that "children aged nine... were denied the 
CSG due to the prolonged application process..." "Ms Nkosi applied for the CSG 
for her twin daughters at Indwe [EC] mobile office, which only visits the area once 
a month. Ms Nkosi applied for the CSG on the 26th of May 2003; the twins are 
born on 17th of September 1994, were thus aged eight at the time of application" 
(Rosa & Mpokotho 2004:19). 
Applications of this nature were mostly rejected because, by the time the 
responses came back, or rather when the processing took place, children no 
longer qualified. 
Several examples illustrated this problem: many applicants like Mrs Shisi were 
denied access "Mrs. Deneo Shishi from KwaNdebele in Mpumalanga was also 
sent away on the basis that her eight year eight months old daughter did not 
qualify, who was born on 25th August 1994, would only qualify after the 1st of 
April 2004"( Rosa & Mpokotho2004:19). 
Mrs Mahlangu stated that "after looking at my son's birth certificate, the official 
told me that a child born in 1994 does not qualify for the Child Support Grant. He 
also added that they were only registering children who were born in 1995" (Rosa 
& Mpokotho 2004:19). 
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The lengthy period used to process applications in the regional offices has had 
an effect on service delivery. According to the "Batho Pele" principles (these 
stipulate the guidelines for service delivery), which all government departments 
are supposed to adhere to when dealing with the public (service delivery 
conduct)," people should come first"; the prolonging of the process therefore 
affects this (Department of Public Service and Administration 2000:1). 
Thus the backward mapping method has been found to be more useful because 
actual issues are attended to and this assists in ensuring that the views of the 
public are heard (Weimer & Vining 2005:284). In order for an organization to be 
able to use such modes of ensuring proper implementation, it has to have 
sufficient capacity to be able to utilise its resources and expertise more 
effectively. 
5.3. Organizational Development 
According to CDRA (CDRA 1995:26 in James 2000:15) organizational 
development can be defined as "the discipline of creating and applying 
processes aimed at developing the capacity of organizations, where capacity is 
seen as their increase in organizational awareness and consciousness such that 
the organization is better able to take control of its own functions and future in a 
responsible manner". The ability of an organization to build capacity and be able 
to solve future problems is viewed as key in ensuring effective and efficient 
attainment of goals (James 2000:15). 
Sufficient resources are required, especially for new policy to be effectively 
implemented (Brinkerhoff & Crosby 2002:35). The accumulation of resources is 
done by constituencies4. These constituencies are tasked to assist the policy-
formulators in acquiring adequate resources to ensure that the policy would be 
Constituencies consist of people with political legitimacy, and power that can influence the allocation of 
resources to see through the implementation of the policy. 
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implemented. Resources include financial, human, technical and material 
resources (Brinkerhoff & Crosby 2002:35). Due to the extension of the CSG, 
more applicants were added to the system. However, there has not been any 
provision of extra mobile units. 
There have been numerous organizational problems that the Department of 
Social Development has encountered when implementing the CSG. These have 
ranged from shortages of materials, improper buildings used to house the DSD, 
lack of capacity of staff, staff shortages and lack of capacity of the system used 
to capture data (SOCPEN). These problems have been mostly experienced in 
provincial and local welfare offices. The welfare offices are supposed to be 
housed in permanent premises, with sufficient equipment and space to provide 
an effective working environment. 
This lack of additional infrastructure, or upgrading thereof, led to the Department 
experiencing what Pressman & Wildavsky (1973:76 in Hill & Hupe 2002:44) 
define as the "implementation deficit". Implementation deficit can be understood 
as the increase in the number of shortfalls created by the small cumulative 
number of the links involved in an implementation chain. 
This deficit can cripple the implementation process and hinders the meeting of 
goals stipulated by the Department. Policy-makers frequently overlook the impact 
that the different aspects needed for implementation has on the outcome. 
The lack of proper infrastructure contributes to the inefficient administration of the 
CSG. All these infrastructural-related problems prevent the Grant reaching the 
beneficiaries. The strengthening of an organization hinges on the capacity of the 
management to use trained staff. Grindle (1997:15) stresses that restructuring 
and upgrading of physical resources, among other initiatives, is essential for 
strengthening the organization. 
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5.3.1. Material Development 
In KwaZulu-Natal Province in Ulundi, Pietermaritzburg, Midlands and Durban 
regions some of the welfare offices were housed in old buildings and others in 
new buildings. Of those that were housed in older buildings the infrastructure did 
not allow for the proper administration of the Grant (Hunter 2004:11). 
In the Daggaskraal study a member of the pension committee reported that 
"councillors and social development officials in Mpumalanga Province in 
Daggaskraal community who are responsible for the CSG roll out reported 
difficulty as a result of insufficient infrastructure. Government officials and 
councillors reported that the increase in the administration load of the CSG 
applicants was not backed by proper infrastructure and adequate resources" (F7 
pension committee member in Ngwenya 2003:75). A further concern raised was 
that "we wish as we have two pay points to have one pay point is not enough 
especially registration of a densely populated area like Sinqobile" (F7 in 
Ngwenya 2003:75). Further, "The infrastructure problems lead to delays in 
registrations. The implementation in Mpumalanga Province (Daggaskraal) has 
also not proceeded well because of infrastructure problems" (F1 a beneficiary in 
Ngwenya 2003:69). 
This is also confirmed in Hunter's study in "older buildings tended not to be able 
to facilitate the large number of applicants who could be seen waiting in corridors 
or along verandas" (Hunter 2004:11). 
With the extension of the CSG the applicants had doubled and therefore required 
increased physical capacity to administer the Grant. 
Infrastructural problems are the ones related to the lack of technical resources, 
like telephones, computers, desks, chairs, etc. The personnel officer in most 
offices in KwaZulu-Natal had access to the telephone while other office members 
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had no access to telephones in their offices. This then means that when the 
personnel officer is not available no one would have access to telephone since 
not all welfare officials have telephones in their offices (Hunter 2004:12). 
Hunter also reported that "in most of these buildings there has been a power cut 
which interferes with the functioning of the offices" (Hunter 2004:12). 
Shortages of functional computers have also been the problem experienced by 
most offices in the provincial and local level. This problem affects the 
implementation of the Grant, because computers are essential in their 
administration as they are required to enter the data into the system (Department 
of Social Development 2004:3). 
Hunter reported that "In one office one of the computers is used for typing only" 
(Hunter 2004:12). Further, "Apart from shortages of computers, another problem 
is that most of the computers in use are relatively old and slow. In one office one 
of the three computers was described as being; "always out of order" (Hunter 
2004:12). 
According to James (2000:11) organizational capacity incorporates the ability of 
an organization to mobilize, organize, and use organizational infrastructure to 
ensure that all individuals are working towards a common goal. Other means of 
ensuring great participation of and organization is the development human 
resources. In additional to human resource development, systems used by 
organizations in their job performance should always be upgraded when 
essential to ensure effective and efficient policy implementation. 
5.3.2. Systems Development 
The administration system used by DSD for the administration of the CSG is 
known as SOCPEN. SOCPEN refers to a Social Pension system, this is used as 
a daily recording system of applicants, who receives the grant, and applicant's 
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whose application was rejected. This data recording system has been inefficient, 
and could not be upgraded to better suit the increased target population 
coverage (Yako 1998:7-8). 
SOCPEN had had its problems even before it was used to administer the 
children's grant. It could not complete the processing and updating of payment 
information timeously, SOCPEN introduced cut- off dates for payments in the 
provinces, to allow sufficient time for SOCPEN to process data. However, this 
arrangement has negative implications on service delivery for the provincial 
governments, the beneficiaries and to limit the number of beneficiaries to 1000 
per day per pay point the contractor has to deploy more equipment and 
resources which is only used for half the month (Yako 1998:7-8). 
Due to the fact that SOCPEN does not have real time access to Home Affairs 
database on the deceased, those beneficiaries who are deceased remain on the 
payment system for a period before SOCPEN is updated for DSD. This leads to 
the payment of non-existent beneficiaries (Yako 1998:7). 
In his study Yako (1998:7) reported that "in short the SOCPEN system could not 
handle the data processing which is required by all the users. It is more than 10 
years old and is a system which has been patched to such an extent that it could 
fall over in the future" (Yako 1998:7). 
These were the reports on the system in 1998. This is an indication that the 
system has to be upgraded or better equipped to avoid bringing these problems 
into the new system. 
In Rosa & Mpokotho's (2004:24) study they indicated that "one of the reasons 
given for the fact that qualifying children were not allowed to apply for the CSG in 
social services offices in some provinces, was that there were problems with the 
SOCPEN system itself'( Rosa & Mphokotho 2004:24) 
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One government official commented that "the SOCPEN has not been upgraded 
and it is difficult for the system to accept applications for children who are above 
the age of seven years. These problems with the system also prevented us from 
making payments to children who turned nine years by the time their application 
has been approved" (Rosa & Mpokotho 2004:24) 
The administrative system forms the core of the implementation of the CSG; if it 
is not upgraded accordingly it thus contributes to ineffective and inefficient 
service delivery. The DSD acknowledges such problems with the system, 
however does not come out with means in which such problems could be dealt 
with while they upgrade or create a stronger system (Hunter 2004:19). 
In his speech to the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) in June 2001, the 
Minister of Social Development, Dr Skweyiya did not dispute the reports by 
government officials of SOCPEN not being capacitated to carry more loads. He 
confirmed that the DSD is aware of the problem with the system and looking into 
ways of changing this. 
The Minister also agreed that "our grants payment system, SOCPEN, is neither 
appropriate for nor up to the task of providing the kinds of management 
information required to ensure the effective delivery of social assistance" 
(Skweyiya 2001:2). 
"The Council of Social Development Ministers has agreed to replace the 
antiquated SOCPEN system within two years" (Department of Social 
Development 2001:3) 
Another illustration of the lack of capacity is with regards to the inability of the 
SOCPEN system to carry over applicants already in the system, to the extended 
years once they reached the previous cut off age. The system still categorises 
beneficiaries as new applicants, re-applicants and continued applications (Rosa 
SMphokotho 2003:16). 
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"This last upsurge is consistent with the fact that, in the last two months of this 
phase of the extension, there were 24,000 children whose grants lapsed..." 
"In February and March 2004 there were only 13 and three such cases 
respectively" (Rosa & Mphokotho 2003:16) 
Figure 1: Trends in application types for CSG in 2003 
Trends in application types 
H Continued recipients 
• Re-application 
• New Applicants 
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ber 
Source: Leatt (2003) using SOCPEN R01 April-September 2003 
Figure 1 above shows the incidents of the different types of registrations due to 
the inability of the system to carry over applicants. The number of re-applications 
that occurred throughout 2003, during the first extension competes with the 
number of continued recipients. In July the number of re-application exceeded 
the number of continued recipients greatly. This means that government officials 
throughout SA were presented mostly with cases they could have not repeated if 
the system was efficient. This cumbersome administrative system hampers the 
proper implementation of the CSG to its target population (Leatt 2003:17). 
This inability of the system to carry over applicants (having applicants carried 
over to next extension phase without being removed from the system, if they are 
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still under 14 years) leads to the prevention of access for some applicants as a 
result of the long unfriendly processes. Some applicants especially those in rural 
areas find it difficult to start the application process from the start and try to gain 
access to the system. As for government officials this means double work. This 
also adds to the confusion, because some of the children have to wait a while 
before they can be recognised as beneficiaries, even though they were already in 
the system (Leatt 2004:7). 
3.3. Human resource development 
Human resource development refers to the ability of the organization not only to 
acquire but also to be able to effectively utilise available human resources to 
attain optimum results (James 2000:9). James argues that if an organization 
lacks human resources, especially organizations focusing on dealing with clients 
as customers, it is faced with high chances of inefficiency. 
In the Eastern and Western Cape Provinces, in Mount Frere, Ceres and 
Khayelitsha welfare offices were faced with difficulties related to administrative 
infrastructure. Under resourced financial and human capital, has led to conflict 
with the needs of the people in rural areas (Leatt 2003:6). 
The infrastructure had not changed in 2004 (with increased targets); if nothing is 
done the third phasing of the CSG would be more disastrous, when children from 
12-14 years are entered into the system (Leatt 2003:6-7). 
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Table 1 above illustrates the increased number of CSG beneficiaries from 2000 
to 2004. With such increased numbers of children accessing the system, the 
infrastructure surely needed upgrading to cater for such numbers. 
According to the budget review by IDASA for 2002/3. The government allocated 
enough financial resources to enable the extension of the CSG. 
"Budget 2002 projects R265.2 billion in revenue for 2002/3. To this we should 
add the R15.2 billion in tax relief and the almost R8.5 billion gained from the 
increased deficit. Thus treasury had a total of R288.9 billion to work with at the 
start of the budget process. This is R40.5 billion more than the R248.5 billion 
available in 2001. Of this R40.5 billion ...62.6% went to social development 
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expenditures..." 
However, financial resources increased to allow for an increase in target 
population, without concomitant infrastructural reform. 
Human resource is the essential part of implementation, especially when it 
comes to service delivery. This provision is not only in terms of available human 
resources but skilled and well equipped to handle tasks allocated to them 
efficiently and effectively. The Department however did not consider that skilled 
personnel are employed for the administration of the Child Support Grant. There 
have been reports from different Provinces regarding the lack of capacity, and 
unskilled and unaccountable welfare staff. This problem has increased with the 
extension of the CSG (Rosa & Mphokotho 2004:23). 
The lack of staff with capacity to deal with the increased number of applicants 
entering the system has been raised among other issues as a concern (Rosa & 
Mphokotho 2004:4-6). In Provinces like the Eastern Cape, the North West and 
Limpopo, areas where services is provided through mobile units. These mobile 
units are reported to only come once a month. This means that a number of 
applicants are left waiting for a time of the month where welfare officials are 
available for applications (Rosa & Mphokotho 2004:23). In most cases welfare 
officials did not understand the regulations on the extension of the grant. 
It was reported that "In some provinces officials were either confused... or not 
informed of the implementation of the phasing in process..." (Mphokotho & Rosa 
2004:24) 
Another problem was the ability of the staff to utilize the skills they have acquired 
through training or otherwise for effective management and performance of their 
tasks. In most Provincial offices Government staff lacked capacity to use the 
acquired skills (registration) to better implement the CSG (Rosa & Mpokotho 
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2004:24). 
Rosa & Mpokotho (2004:24) found that "through our interaction with various 
government officials, it was apparent that they even did not understand the new 
regulations on the extension of the CSG" (Rosa & Mpokotho 2004:24) 
Grindle (1997:53) emphasises that the issue of human resource is not always 
lack of skills, but another crucial issue is the provision of incentives like better 
pay, work restructuring, opening decision making process and managing 
authority relationships in the workplace (Grindle 1997:53). 
Another issue with regards to government officials was there was not enough 
staff allocated for CSG administration. In many welfare offices the situation was 
that the number of applicants has been larger compared to the staff available to 
process applications. The staff shortages have been observed as resulting from 
the extension of the Child Support Grant. (Hunter 2003:15). 
In the Daggaskraal study one of the Grant managers explained that 
"Daggaskraal is densely populated area with so many applicants, which makes it 
difficult for us to work effectively with a quiet small number of officials that we 
have" (02 grant manager in Ngwenya 2003:72). 
"If we are five we register almost 79 applicants because, we have to duplicate as 
well and this contribute to the slow process of registration" (02 grant manager in 
Ngwenya 2003:72). 
"Another problem is that we are short-staffed and that is why we have trained 
volunteers to assist" (01 grant manager in Ngwenya 2003:72). 
According to Hunter (2004:13) the shortages of staff has been evident from the 
first phasing (extension to children under 9), second phasing as well as third 
phasing (extension to children under the age of 14 years). With these increased 
numbers the number of staff administrating the grant has not increased. This 
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leads to staff members performing the tasks of other unavailable personnel, in 
areas where they are not trained. In KwaZulu-Natal some offices did not have a 
head of administration. This means that the administrative staff had no 
monitoring or support services offered to them, to help them cope with their jobs 
(Hunter 2003:13). 
Hunter reported that "Normally an administrative clerk is responsible for taking 
grant applications, completing and verifying information, capturing the information 
onto the computer. However as a result of staff shortages the task of an 
administrative clerk is sometimes performed by help desk officer" (Hunter 
2004:13). 
It is not proper conduct to fill in the duties of other personnel especially when a 
person has no training relevant to the duty they perform. In her study Hunter 
(2004:14) reported that a help desk officer is not trained to deal with applications, 
as much as they can be aware of processes the administrative clerk does when 
administering the grant, but they are not trained for that thus they lack capacity. 
They also will not perform the job as the administrative clerk would (Hunter 
2004:14). It is therefore important to ensure that a person receives proper 
training before they undertake additional duties. 
According to Ngwenya (2003:22) officials in Mpumalanga Province 
(Draggaskraal area) were overworked as a result of staff shortages, and low pay 
which led to officials taking bribes from the applicants if they wanted their 
applications to be processed quickly (Ngwenya 2003:22).This engaging in 
improper conduct by government's administrative staff, can be attributed to the 
lack of support by the superiors. 
In Ngwenya's study a non-beneficiary reported that "one day I saw a mother that 
we started applying with carrying a chicken, when I asked her what she was 
doing with the chicken she said; no I am tired now there is something that I am 
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going to do with this chicken. The next thing she had her application processed" 
(F1 a beneficiary in Ngwenya 2003:68) 
"If you don't have money you could bring a chicken as well" (F4 a non-beneficiary 
in Ngwenya 2003:68;. 
The Department of Social Development's norms specify that an administrative 
clerk should not take less than 20 applicants per day. However as a result of staff 
shortages many administrative workers exceed this number or do lesser 
depending on the applicants available (Hunter 2003:14). The consequences of 
this are that these administrative officers, are overworked, and the accuracy in 
completing their jobs cannot be guaranteed. 
Hunter reported that "...in Ndwedwe office contract workers are expected to see 
15 applicants per day" (Hunter 2004:14;. 
According to Grindle (1997:53) the problem with human resource capacity in 
organizations is that the personnel is not well prepared for their task, and the 
manner in which they utilize the skills they have is usually lost through lack of 
motivation. In addition to motivation continuous monitoring of the policy ensures 
that issues like lack of motivation and others related to the implementation are 
addressed. 
5.4. Monitoring and Evaluation 
Evaluation is viewed as a systematic assessment of a policy, to determine the 
successes and progress of such policy. Evaluation can be conducted 
systematically or informally. Systematic evaluation enables for the evaluation to 
be conducted employing social science research techniques. This allows for 
carefully found outcomes that adjudicate for a thorough and more precise way of 
improving the program or policy (Weiss 1998:4). With regards to the 
administration of the CSG, there were many loopholes which opened the door for 
many problems. These loopholes have led to the culture of fraud and corruption. 
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Rosa & Mphokotho (2004:22) reported that "the problems experienced by our 
callers in accessing the extended CSG demonstrate a lack of monitoring 
measures and a lack of means of enforcing compliance with the law by the 
National Department of Social Development" (Rosa & Mpokotho 2004:22). 
These loop holes in the system have created irresponsible citizens and public 
servants; this is because the officials are sometimes aware of such acts but don't 
report them, thus contribute to corruption. Mbambo (2005:35) reported that a lack 
of essential monitoring mechanisms, and control on the issuing of birth 
certificates by government officials contributes to fraud. 
Most often once the policy is passed and measures for implementation put in 
place, and implementation had initiated the assumptions is that the outcome will 
be the intended one. Policy monitoring and evaluation is essential to give a 
picture as to the outcome of the policy. Dye (1981:366) argues that lack of 
monitoring and evaluation has been found to be the cause for many policy 
failures in public policy field. 
The guiding principles for service delivery are usually disregarded by government 
officials. These principles are created to serve as a guiding instrument for 
service delivery, also to inform the public of their rights these are issues of; 
equity, non-discrimination, human rights, quality services (Mbambo 2005:35). As 
a result of the lack of such principles there is no way that the clients or 
government officials can monitor their performance regarding service delivery. 
However many applicants have reported ill-treatment by government officials, 
when they went to apply for the Grant. 
In her study Ngwenya found that "Officials mistreat us, for example they said that 
I am too old to have small children like these knowing exactly that they are my 
grandchildren. I am suffering and abused for example a volunteer (home based 
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care) said to me in 2000 that we steal children so that we can get a grant" (F4 
non-beneficiary in Ngwenya 2003:75,) 
The mistreating of clients goes unnoticed most of the time, because it happens in 
private and they are reluctant to report the perpetrators because they are afraid 
for their lives. With such ill treatment people are more likely not to go and apply 
for the Grant, because they are afraid they might.be victims; this then affects the 
target population coverage ( F4 a non-beneficiary in Ngwenya 2003:75). 
Worthan, Sanders & Fitzpatrick (1997:10) argued that lack of consistent 
monitoring and evaluation of the policy implemented can lead to improper 
implementation of the policy. They argue that it is also important not to conduct 
poor monitoring, because this has even more impact than no monitoring at all. 
This leads to what is called pseudoevaluation (Worthan, Sanders & Fitzpatrick 
1997:10). According to reports since the year 2000, about 1.5 billion has been 
lost each year until 2004 on fraud. This means that there are multiple 
beneficiaries that claim money from the system, which then gives a misleading 
picture that the target population is widely reached (Department of Social 
Development 2004:3). 
The Minister of DSD Zola Skweyiya confirmed that "as I said in 2002, the grant 
administration system has over the years been afflicted by continuing serious 
problems of fraud, corruption and mal-administration" (Department of Social 
Development 2004:2) 
"Over 100 government officials have also been prosecuted.""... a significant 
number of those who were not eligible to receive grants have been removed from 
the system" 
A non-beneficiary in Ngwenya's study (2003:79) reported that "there is a problem 
that happened to my cousin and I was with her that pay day. She was told that 
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she has already received her money and she was turned away. She called the 
office in Standerton and she was told that her money is with Empilweni 
contractor. She went back to the officials to ask for money but she was told the 
same thing again that there is no money for her. This thing happened last month 
and we do not know if she will receive her money this month" (F4 a non-
beneficiary in Ngwenya 2003:79). 
Figure 2: Number of beneficiaries for CSG from 2000-2004 
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Source: SOCPEN R01:2003(Department of Social development) 
Figure 2 above illustrates beneficiaries of the CSG from 2000-2004. This 
information is the information that the Department uses to guide them towards 
their targets; however about 1.5 billion is lost each year through fraud this means 
that over the years about 42 million people from the beneficiaries have been non-
existent people. 
According to the DSD's system about 36, 904 care givers were reported dead by 
March 2004. This number does not capture the number of children in receipt of 
the grant who have also been reported dead and those numbers of unreported 
62 
deaths. The verification of applicant's status then becomes inefficient, because 
besides the number of deaths that are not reported to the DHA, a loop hole to the 
system is created (Leatt 2003:15). As a result of the lack of constant monitoring 
of the implementation of the CSG, many corrupt habits have found their way into 
the system. 
The DSD reported that "the Department of Home Affairs has also informed us 
that there are over 14 400 cases of children who according to the records of the 
Department of Home Affairs indicated as deceased, but people continue to 
collect the Child Support grant" (Department of Social Development 2005:2). 
This information then leads to a conclusion that there is a lack of verification of 
the applicants, between the Department of Social Development and Department 
of Home Affairs. These then posses a question as to whether the partnership is 
effective in proper implementation of the Child Support Grant. Also this suggests 
that the administrative clerks nation wide are not properly performing their duties, 
as explained the duties of administrative clerks include verifying the applicant's 
status. 
Constant monitoring assists in addressing issues at hand based on the existing 
policy issue. This then ensures that there are no continuous problems in the 
system (Parsons 1995:222). Parsons also argues that each and every monitoring 
done should be original in each phase to ensure that each time possible or actual 
problems are detected and solutions created. 
Therefore, monitoring not only assist in tracing the steps of service delivery but 
also prevents any unethical and improper service delivery (Weiss, 1998:15). 
The purpose for constant monitoring is also to form basis of information. This 
means that if the DSD would want to evaluate how the implementation of CSG 
has unfolded, there have to have information of the process and progress, also 
problems encountered and how they were resolved. 
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5.6. Consequences of Poor Implementation 
The Child Support Grant has had a positive impact on the lives of children in 
South Africa. It is estimated that over 6 million children receive the CGS in South 
Africa at present (Department of Social Development 2005:3). This number could 
have however been increased. The way in which the Grant has been 
implementation of this Grant has prevented some potential beneficiaries from 
accessing the grant. 
Problems ranged from bureaucratic process which prolong the application 
process, to street level bureaucrats that practice their own discretion, to human 
resource development, organization restructuring. The Department of Social 
Development underestimated, or overlooked the impact that the extension of the 
CSG would have to the administration of the CSG. 
The Department neglected many essential aspects of implementation. According 
to Brinkerhoff & Crosby (2002:90) resources need to be accumulated, and 
mobilized to ensure effective implementation. Fixers have to be available to 
ensure that they direct the implementation towards a right direction. Street level 
bureaucrats need to be dealt with first especially if there is a policy change. 
Lipsky (1980:8) argued that the consultation of the SLBs is crucial to the manner 
in which the policy would be implemented. He also argued that because they use 
discretion with regards to their duties and try to simplify their tasks as possible, 
this dilutes policy objectives. 
Many of the experienced problems have been in the field of administration of the 
CSG. Since 2002 the DSD has been losing about 1, 5 billion per annum through 
fraud and maladministration. Such problems have been crippling the system and 
preventing proper implementation of the CSG (Department of Social 
Development 2005:4). 
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In addition the DSD did not provide for any additional resources to accommodate 
the increased target population. The shortage of resources is mostly for; human; 
infrastructural and technical resources. Financial resources in terms of the 
increase in the social security budget, especially for the CSG provision have 
however shown an increase (Department of Social Development 2005:2). 
The number of beneficiaries has increased over the years, (Figure 2). However, 
there are complaints about the inadequacy in the registration of applicants for the 
grant. The Department of Social Development is aware that the administrative 
system is not efficient and effective for administering the CSG. This has be 
asserted by the Minister (Dr Zola Skweyiya) announcement of the anti-fraud, 
corruption and mal-administration campaign in December 2004(Department of 
Social Development 2005:2). 
"As I said in 2002, the grant administration system has over the years been 
afflicted by continuing serious problems..." 
Even though there have been several changes made to the amount and reach of 
the CSG, the administration of the grant is still problematic. Some of the 
prevailing problems encountered by the Department of Social Development are; 
poor infrastructure in provinces leading to poor uptake of the applicants for Child 
Support Grant in as far as achieving the CSG's targets. 
Dissemination of inaccurate information by provincial heads to the local officials, 
which has led to provinces giving and implementing wrong procedures. 
Lack of human resource capacity in Provinces where many officials are not 
properly trained to administer the grants and this has led to mal-administration 
and fraud. 
Gaps in the administration process, like accessing of birth certificates have led to 
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fraud and corruption by officials. This has cost the government about 1.5 billion 
per annum (Department of Social Development 2002:16-17). 
The DSD issued out a 3 year strategic plan in 2002, this was for the year 
2002/2003 to 2004/2005. In this report the DSD has what it called "ten point 
plan". This "ten point plan" was to serve as the focus of the department for the 
three year period. These plans were as follows, in order of priority. 
• Rebuilding of family , community and social relations 
• creating an integrated poverty eradication strategy 
• To develop a comprehensive social security system 
• To respond to violence against women and children, older persons and 
other vulnerable groups of people. 
• To include HIV/AIDS community based care and support services. 
• To develop a national strategy for youth development to reduce the 
number of youth in conflict with the law. 
• To increase the accessibility of social welfare services especially for 
people living in rural areas. 
• To redesign services to people with disabilities in order to promote human 
rights and economic development. 
• To train, educate, redeploy a new category of workers in social 
development (this was to include re-orientation of social service workers to 
meet the global and regional demands) (Department of Social 
Development 2002). 
In the three year plan the DSD had prioritized children's issues through; ensuring 
that eligible children access social assistance and other issues (Department of 
Social Development 2004:14). In order to ensure that children access social 
assistance one of them of which is the CSG, issues that inhibit this access had to 
be addressed as this is an administration process. 
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The discussion has shown that this problem has existed and continues to exist 
over the years despite the governments attempts. This study outlines these 
administrative problems and makes links to the extent of their impact on the 
implementation of CSG. 
Bureaucratic way of implementing policy, organizational capacity strengthening, 
human resource development, systems development, street level bureaucrats' 
discretionary powers and lack of sufficient monitoring and evaluations are the 
problems that inhibit efficient and effective implementation of CSG. The 
Department of Social Development, has an obligation to provide social services 
(social security specifically), and since the administrative process form an 




The Child Support Grant (CSG) has been created as one of the means for 
poverty reduction, particularly childhood poverty in South Africa. This Grant has 
been utilized by many families as the income basis for a household. This grant 
was initially given to children under 7 years old (Cassiem & Streak 2001:56). Due 
to the pressures from different stakeholders, and non- governmental institutions 
this Grant was then extended to the children under the age of 14. However, with 
each implementation phase numerous problems resulted. 
This study has critically analysed the implementation of the child support grant, 
focusing on administrative problems that have resulted through the way in which 
this grant has been implemented. The study analysed findings of the previous 
studies (making use of content analysis) focusing on problems of implementation 
which were experienced by administrators and beneficiaries of the CSG in South 
Africa. 
When the CSG was implemented it experienced problems. However, additional 
problems resulted with the extension of the Grant to children under 14 years. The 
findings showed that these problems resulted from lack of capacity 
(organizational, material and human resource) development. With the added 
numbers of beneficiaries the system required upgrading to ensure that there is 
sufficient capacity for proper implementation. According to James (2000:13) 
capacity development "is an intergral part of the work and life of an organization" 
this means that capacity development is a long continuous process that begins 
when the organization is developed throughout its existence. James (2000:14) 
argues that this process focuses at deepening the organizations current capacity 
and equips them for future situations. 
Further, Grindle (1997:250) argues that for effective achievement of results with 
new policies, government should reconsider building a new system for 
implementation. Another alternative to a new system could be reforming the 
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organization to ensure that the environment is more suitable. With regards to the 
extension of CSG to cover more children (up to 14 years) the Department of 
Social Development neglected to; upgrade its system, employ more efficient 
staff, create ways of ensuring that decisions are taken with concrete information 
of the situation thus insufficient monitoring and evaluation existed. The gathering 
of concrete information can be achieved through monitoring and evaluation of the 
implementation process. According to Weiss (1998:15) the main purpose of 
evaluation and monitoring is to assess the conditions that would exist without the 
intervention. Therefore any problems resulting from the intervention which 
prevent the proper implementation of the policy are detected and the solutions 
are sought. 
Another important issue is the lines of communication the organization used. The 
CSG was implemented through top down mode of implementation. This mode on 
its own does not allow for flexibility or any inputs from the lower levels of the 
organizations (street level bureaucrats) (Hill & Hupe 2002:89). As a result street 
level bureaucrats create rules which simplify their work and functions, thus 
affecting the outcome of the policy (Lipsky 1980:257). The disseminating of 
incorrect instructions compromises the policies intended goals. According to 
Parsons (1995:465), communication is an essential part in achieving perfect 
implementation. The Department of Social Development has not been able to 
accomplish this within its bureaucratic system. Government officials of the 
respective Department have not been able to understand and translate 
instruction to enable successful implementation. This ineffective communication 
has led to confusion as to what procedures to follow. 
The major fall out with this Grant was initially that change was initiated from the 
outside (stakeholders); it was not part of the government's goals. As a result of 
the pressures from different stakeholders and other non-governmental 
organizations the idea of extending the grant was adopted. The hesitation to 
cover all children at once was an indication of the load that the extension of the 
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grant had on the existing system. The system was also still new, even though 
most of the characteristics were borrowed from the old system. This new system 
with new policies did not have enough capacity to expand to the extent it was 
pushed to expand to. The carrying on of the system to carry more load than it 
already had meant carrying over the problems experienced in the initial 
implementation to the extension phases. 
Therefore the DSD's indecision on capacity development and proper managing 
of the implementation through consistent monitoring and evaluation by the 
Department has led to ineffective and inefficient implementation of the CSG. 
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Recommendations 
• The Department of Social Development should ensure that proper 
planning is put and research on the current situation, also consider 
possible problems that would be brought by the new intervention 
• When implementing Social Security government officials should adhere to 
procedures as specified in the policy to avoid confusions and 
disseminating wrong information to the public. 
• The Department should take each implementation problems carefully. 
• There should be constant monitoring of the implementation, quarterly to 
ensure that the problems are dealt with as they arise. 
• Street Level bureaucrats' jobs should have performance measuring tools, 
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thus, only collusion can bypass this important control feature. Examples of items that 
should be under dual control are: vault cash, negotiable collateral, investment 
securities, reserve supply of checks, unissued travelers' checks, credit cards and 
money orders, the night depository, mail receipts, ATM cash, dormant savings 
accounts, and spare keys to cashier drawers. 
7. Protection of Assets - A principal method of safeguarding assets is to limit access to 
authorized personnel only. Protection of assets can be accomplished by: 
• Developing operating policies and procedures for cash control; 
• Establishing dual control over cash; 
• Conducting periodic physical inventories of credit union assets; 
• Protecting assets by purchasing adequate insurance; 
• Requiring the use of passwords to access the computer system and changing 
passwords no less than quarterly; and 
• Limiting physical access to cash and the computer system. 
8. Zero Tolerance - The credit union should have a culture that supports internal 
controls and does not tolerate excessive errors or fraud. These values can be 
promoted by establishing: 
• Severe consequences for fraud that are written, conveyed verbally, and strictly 
followed. All fraudulent acts should be met with swift and permanent action; 
• Clear negative consequences for staff with excessive error rates; 
• A performance based incentive system that rewards high productivity and low 
error rates; 
• Competitive salaries that reduce the motivation to commit fraud; and 
• Training that explains the reasons behind internal controls and emphasizes how 
fraud and errors hurt the institution and its members. 
9. Personnel Policies - Personnel policies should specifically state the consequences for 
fraudulent acts and excessive errors so each employee understands the ramifications 
of such actions. Employees should be familiar with the personnel policy; a review of 
this policy should be part of each employee's initial training. The policy at a 
minimum should: 
• Require management to check references of prospective employees; 
• Include written position descriptions that define the duties, responsibilities, and 
performance standards for each position; and 
• Require written performance appraisals of all employees annually. 
10. Rotation of Personnel - From time to time, employee job functions should be rotated 
unannounced. The rotation should be of sufficient duration to discover any fraud. 
Besides being an effective internal check, rotation of personnel is a valuable aid in the 
credit union's overall training program as employees learn how to perform other jobs. 
The cross-trained employee can substitute when other employees take vacations, are 
absent, or are rotated. 
